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"No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of
the interest."1 Students have struggled with the Rule against
Perpetuities,2 and scholars and practitioners urge simplification,3
but deep in the Rule lies a beauty, part of which stems from the
very complexity and intricacy many bemoan.4 The Rule merits
1. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942).
2. See, e.g., Lynn, Perpetuities Literacy for the 21st Century, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 219,
220 (1989).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.1-.6 (1983)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (DONATIVE TRANSFERS)] (adopting a wait-and-see approach);
UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 8A U.L.A. 103, 132-38 (Supp. 1989)
(recommending a wait-and-see approach with a fixed 90-year waiting period); Browder,
Future Interest Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1255, 1275-78 (1960); Dukeminier, A Modern
Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1880-84 (1986) (describing the Rule as
overburdened with technicalities and defending wait-and-see approach); Epstein, Past and
Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 667, 713
(1986); Haskell, A Proposal for a Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities, 66
N.C.L. REV. 545, 558-64 (1988) (proposing radical reformulation of the Rule); Leach,
Perpetuities Legislation: Hail Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124 (1960) [hereinafter
Hail Pennsylvania!] (applauding statutory reform of the rule); Leach, Perpetuities in
Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. .721, 747-48 (1952)
[hereinafter Reign of Terror] (proposing wait-and-see approach); Leach, Perpetuities:
Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 L.Q. REV. 35, 58-59 (1952) [hereinafter Staying
the Slaughter] (proposing "[lI]egislation following a comprehensive study"); Lynn,
Reforming the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 488, 501-03
(1961) (stating that the Rule is no longer a great threat); Maudsley, Perpetuities:
Reforming the Common-Law Rule-How to Wait and See, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 355, 361-
79 (1975) (advocating wait-and-see); Schuyler, Should We Abolish the Rule Against
Perpetuities? 41 CHI. B. REC. 139, 150 (1959) (advocating changes in the Rule); Time,
Property Rights, and the Common Law: Roundtable Discussion, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 793, 842
(1986) [hereinafter Roundtable] (encouraging total elimination of the Rule); Waggoner,
The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting
Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 162-68 (1988) (defending 90-year fixed period); cf
Bloom, Perpetuities Refinement: There is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. REV. 23, 63-77
(1987) (criticizing the reform effort and suggesting refinement); Fletcher, Perpetuities:
Basic Clarity, Muddled Reform, 63 WASH. L. REV. 791, 825-39 (1988) (criticizing the
reform efforts). But see L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 72-73 (1955)
(opposing reforms such as wait-and-see); Fetters, The Perpetuities Period in Gross and the
Child en Ventre sa Mare in Relation to the Determination of Common-Law and Wait-and-
See Measuring Lives: A Minor Heresy Stated and Defended, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 309, 322-27
(1976); Fetters, Perpetuities: The Wait-and-See Disaster-A Brief Reply to Professor
Maudsley, with a Few Asides to Professors Leach, Simes, Wade, Dr. Morris, et al., 60
CORNELL L. REV. 380, 388-407 (1975) [hereinafter Reply] (criticizing proposed reforms of
the Rule); Powell, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Spendthrift Trusts in New York
Comments and Suggestions, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 688, 693-94 (1971) (opposing wait-and-
see). The Uniform Act has been endorsed by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association, the Board of Regents of the American College of Probate Counsel, and the
Board of Governors of the American College of Real Estate Lawyers. Waggoner, supra, at
158-59.
4. The Rule has been associated with complexity since its creation. The modern Rule
derives from The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 2 Swanston 454, 22 Eng. Rep. 931
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one more charitable look before rejection or reformation, lest
that beauty be appreciated too late.'
Though the Rule has attracted much scholarly attention,
Professor Casner, the reporter for the Restatement, has noted
that "[t]he basis or justification for the assumption that social
welfare requires the imposition of restrictions upon the interfer-
ence with the alienation of property has never been adequately
explored and has been seldom discussed."' 6 The first goal of this
Article is to extend that exploration, explaining how the Rule
enhances economic well-being by improving the allocation of
assets, collecting enjoyable packages of rights, and hastening the
appreciation of interests. 7 More generally, the primary purpose
is to identify and explain the three types of economic benefits
that might be generated when the Rule against Perpetuities
changes an intended transfer of rights into a transfer different
from that intended and to determine which of those three bene-
fits accrues in each of the basic patterns in which the Rule may
work a redistribution. This analysis takes the doctrine as a
given, classifies the theoretical operation of the Rule into a few
paradigms identified by use of examples, and examines each par-
adigm to determine what economic benefits might accrue in
(H.L. 1682). See A. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW
211-16 (1961). In that case the House of Lords struggled to deal with a complex estate
planned by the ingenious Sir Orlando Bridgeman. Id.
5. Twenty-two states have modified, by statute or opinion, the Rule against
Perpetuities. Three states have enacted the Uniform Act, which effects simplification by
setting a fixed 90-year period and adopting the wait-and-see approach. MINN. STAT.
§ 501A.01-.07 (West Supp. 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ I11. 103-.1035 (Michie Supp.
1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). The common-law
Rule has been modified statutorily to a wait-and-see approach in 11 more states. See
Haskell, supra note 3, at 546 n. I (including Alaska, Iowa, Kentucky, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington). Five
state legislatures have enacted limited wait-and-see statutes. See id. (including
Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Maryland, and Massachusetts). Judicial decisions indicate
the wait-and-see approach would apply in three more states. See id. (Mississippi, New
Hampshire, and North Dakota). In five of the remaining twenty-eight states, legislation
calls for reformation, and in two more, judicial opinions endorse that particular mode of
perpetuities reform. See id. (California, Hawaii, Illinois, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma,
and West Virginia). Patchwork reforms (involving, for example, the fertile octogenarian)
have appeared in three additional states. See id. (Delaware, New Jersey, and Tennessee).
That leaves, at most, 20 states in which the common-law Rule remains entirely intact.
6. RESTATEMENT (DONATIVE TRANSFERS), supra note 3, at 8.
7. Scholars often critique a rule by reference to the degree to which it accomplishes
the purpose for which it was adopted. This Article avoids the historical question of why
the Rule was adopted and, instead, identifies the beneficial consequences flowing from the
Rule, regardless of whether they were intended. From this perspective, whether the Rule
accomplishes its original purpose is unimportant.
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cases of that type. The attempt is to reach logical, rather than
empirical, conclusions such as "In Example 1-type situations,
such and such economic benefit obtains."
In the course of identifying benefits of the Rule, this Article
demonstrates that evolutionary theory provides reason to resist
the presumption that transferors will attempt to divide their gifts
so as to maximize the benefits derived by their donees. That
Darwinian critique of donative behavior offers some theoretical
basis for societal interference with the intent of transferors. In
arguing that the law distributes rights more appropriately than
do private parties, this Article takes a position disagreeable to
many economists. This Article does not start with the common
assumption that the donors' intended distributions of rights are
the most efficient and then attempt to justify the Rule's regula-
tion of donative dispositions on the basis of some externality,
such as the high administrative costs paid by society in the pro-
cess of honoring the intention of grantors.8 Instead, this Article
attempts to undermine the initial assumption that the donors do
what is best for society or, even, for their donees.
Identification of the ways in which the Rule's rejection of
some intended dispositions works a benefit is the first, but not
the only, objective of this Article. Acknowledging that few gains
come without costs, a second goal must be to identify unhappi-
nesses, inefficient incentives, and some of the unfairnesses caused
by the Rule. A third goal of this Article is to point out that
some of the very defects urged by critics as justifications for
reform-the traps for the unwary, the complexity, and the
Rule's remorseless operationg9 -combine, perversely, to reduce
the negative side effects that ordinarily accompany governmen-
tal redistributions of rights. Because of the circumstances in
which the Rule often operates, it can redistribute rights and
enhance efficiency without causing the usual damage resulting
from governmental interference with private decisions regarding
distribution.
8. The costs of determining remote heirs and other costs incidental to the
administration of estates that vest far in the future might not be borne fully by the testator
and the remote heirs. Since those costs are external to the donor, they possibly outweigh
the marginal benefit of adding remote donees. I thank Judge Posner for this point.
9. Professor Leach indicates dissatisfaction with the remorseless operation of the
Rule in Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. RFV. 973, 974 (1965)
("Throughout [Gray's) massive tome you can find no hint of protest at... the 'remorseless'
(his word) construction of wills and trusts to slaughter dispositions that never had an.
outside chance of violating any precept of public policy.").
1990] 709
HeinOnline  -- 64 Tul. L. Rev. 709 1989-1990
TULANE LAW REVIEW[
In identifying potential costs and benefits of the Rule, this
Article provides a framework for (1) analyzing the merit of par-
ticular applications of the Rule, (2) evaluating which modifica-
tions, if any, would work improvements, and (3) determining
whether the Rule is worth keeping. Although the Article
presents considerations for and against the Rule, it reaches no
conclusion about the merit of the Rule or any of the proposed
reforms. Following the discussion of economic effects, the
penultimate section raises, without resolving, some of the ethical
questions posed by the common-law Rule against Perpetuities.
In addition, the Article will make, by example rather than
discussion, two broader points relating to donative transfers in
general. One point is that market transactions can serve as a
standard against which donative transfers can be compared or
measured. The second point is that important differences
between the results of donative and market transfers, unless
explainable by market imperfections, ought to be considered to
be consumption by the donors.
Four warnings are in order. Readers should be aware that
the Article presents the issues lying at the heart of the Rule with
a few fairly simple examples. These examples were not chosen
because they represent the most common actual transfers, but
rather because they illustrate the basic theoretical ways in which
the Rule works. Furthermore, the discussion of the examples
ignores many recent legislative and judicial modifications of the
common-law Rule. Different results may obtain in many juris-
dictions. The analysis also ignores some of the factual complica-
tions that can lead to different results even under the common-
law Rule. 10 Nevertheless, the discussion here should assist in the
analysis of any variant, traditional or modern, of the Rule
against Perpetuities. Third, the Article does not purport to
determine the purposes for which the Rule was originally
adopted.I1 The inquiry here proceeds free of historical blinders,
scanning broadly for any beneficial consequences of the Rule
without regard to whether they were intended originally.
Fourth, and finally, this Article stops short of answering the
ultimate question whether a common-law version of the Rule, a
10. For an informed illustration of the different results that may obtain upon slight
changes of circumstantial facts, see Lynn, supra note 2, at 223-24.
11. Professors Gray and Leach indicate that the Rule was originally intended to
prevent the removal of property from the stream of commerce. See J. GRAY, supra note 1,
§ 119; Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 640 (1938).
710 [Vol. 64
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modified Rule, or no Rule against Perpetuities should constrict
transfers of property. One reason for not reaching a bottom-line
conclusion is that the magnitude of many of the positive and
negative economic effects might be better guessed by persons
having years of practical experience with donative dispositions
than by those that understand the Rule only through appellate
opinions and scholarly writings. Furthermore, because the eco-
nomic theory helps to identify the potential costs and benefits,
but not to determine their size, a conclusion even as to the eco-
nomic advisability of the Rule is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. Still another reason for inconclusiveness is that economic
effects do not tell the whole story. The Article assumes that eco-
nomic consequences ought to be considered in determining the
fate of the Rule, but it does not presume to assign more weight
to those considerations than to others, such as justice and lib-
erty. In addition, though the Article touches briefly on a few
ethical points, it does not attempt to analyze all such issues.
Because the Article does not purport to discuss all important
considerations and does not propose a system for balancing ethi-
cal 12 losses against economic gains, it cannot claim a solution.
Concerning the Rule against Perpetuities, the point here is only
to further the economic analysis of the Rule and to make a few
other comments, not to urge one program over another. Thus,
unlike the traditional article proposing reform (or, less often,
defending the status quo against reform), this Article does not
reach or even attempt to reach that sort of normative
conclusion.
I. THE OPERATION OF THE RULE13
A. A Basic Prohibition
The Rule against Perpetuities prevents the creation of cer-
tain future interests in land and personalty, the sort described by
Professor Gray's classic statement quoted above.14 As his state-
ment indicates, the Rule proscribes certain contingent interests.
An interest is contingent if it is not vested in interest,15 which
12. Though utilitarian considerations obviously may form the basis of a system of
ethics, "ethical" as used here refers to nonutilitarian considerations.
13. This brief summary is not intended to encapsulate all important aspects of the
Rule's operation. For more complete explanations of its workings, see generally J. GRAY,
supra note 1; Dukeminier, supra note 3; Leach, supra note 11.
14. See supra text accompanying note 1.
15. The time at which an interest vests in possession is irrelevant to the operation of
1990]
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occurs when the holder is unidentifiable or when the interest is
subject to an unsatisfied condition precedent. 16 A future interest
given to "Smith's heirs" is contingent while Smith- is alive
because his heirs cannot be ascertained or identified until Smith
dies. A future interest created in 1990 with language such as
"but if two inches of rain accumulate in the summer of 1991,
then to Jones" is also contingent at the time of its creation,
because the interest is subject to an explicit condition prece-
dent. 17 Not until sometime in the summer of 1991, if ever, can
the interest vest. No matter which sort of contingency, the Rule
prohibits the creation of the interest if it might vest too late. 18
B. The Effects of the Rule's Operation
The penalty for failure to heed the proscription is nullifica-
tion of the violative interest. The common-law Rule against Per-
petuities nullifies ab initio interests that do not conform to its
strictures.' 9 The prohibited perpetuities never existed and will
never exist because the clauses purporting to create them are
legally ineffective.20 Nevertheless, the rights associated with an
invalid interest in Blackacre do not simply disappear. The law
strikes down only the offending interest itself. The effect of the
Rule when applied to an invalid interest, then, is to redistribute
rights of future control or benefit of Blackacre from one person
(the person that would have taken an interest but for the Rule)2"
the Rule. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE
INTERESTS 180 (2d ed. 1984); Leach, supra note 11, at 639-40. Some scholars have
proposed, however, that the Rule should focus upon vesting in possession rather than
vesting interest. See Haskell, supra note 3, at 549.
16. Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 1875.
17. Determining whether a condition is a condition precedent can be difficult. See A.
CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 295-96 (3d ed. 1984).
18. "Too late" is more than 21 years after the deaths of all persons alive at the time
the interest was created. The example just given would not violate the Rule because it will
vest or not vest (the rain will either accumulate or not) within two years of its creation.
19. Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 1873; Leach, supra note 11, at 652 example 28.
20. See Leach, supra note 11, at 656 ("Where an interest is void under the Rule
against perpetuities, it is stricken out; ... the other interests created in the will or trust
instrument take effect as if the void interest had never been written.").
21. "Person that" will be used in preference to "person who" whenever the clause
following "person" further defines the person. This usage has the advantage of allowing
two different words ("that" and "who") to serve two different purposes (introducing
defining and nondefining clauses, respectively). See H. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN ENGLISH USAGE, 701-02 (E. Gowers 2d. rev. ed. 1983). Further, it fits better
with the legal sense of "person," which includes corporations to which "who" seems
somewhat inappropriate.
[Vol. 64
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to another person.22 Who that other person is depends upon the
language of the conveyance.
In some cases, the transferor, having failed to convey all of
her interest, retains the rights that she apparently intended to
transfer.2 a
Example 1: 0 conveys Blackacre "to A and his heirs so long
as no liquor is sold on the premises, and in the event liquor is
sold on the premises, then to B and his heirs." 24
Because the critical event, the sale of liquor on Blackacre may
occur long after everyone alive at the time of the transfer has
been dead for twenty-one years, the interest subject to that con-
dition precedent violates the Rule against Perpetuities. By the
Rule, B's interest is void, A's interest remains a fee simple deter-
minable, and 0 retains a possibility of reverter. In this
instance, the Rule against Perpetuities redistributes to the trans-
feror, 0, the rights associated with the sale of liquor on the
premises.26
In other cases, such as the following example, the rights
associated with the nullified interest pass to the prior transferee
in the instrument.
Example 2: 0 conveys Blackacre "to A and his heirs, but if
the premises shall be used for the sale of liquors, then to B and
his heirs."
For the same reason as in Example 1, the future interest violates
the Rule. But the result of that invalidity differs because of the
different phrasing. In Example 2 the Rule against Perpetuities
redistributes, from B to A, the rights in Blackacre associated
with the contingency that liquors are sold, with the result that A
takes a fee simple absolute.27 Thus, who receives the rights asso-
ciated with the interest voided by the Rule depends on the lan-
22. The label the law puts upon the package of rights may change when one person
holds what were formerly two sets of rights, as when a life estate merges into a remainder in
fee to form a fee simple, but the underlying rights have not disappeared.
23. Unless otherwise indicated, transferors will be assumed to be female and
transferees male.
24. That this example is the first should not be interpreted to mean that it is a
common transfer. As stated in the caveat above, this and other examples were chosen for
their ability to illustrate the theoretical ways in which the Rule operates rather than their
ability to convey an accurate impression of which transfers are usually made by transferors.
25. See Leach, supra note 11, at 656 example 38.
26. This redistribution is only a redistribution by comparison to what would have
been the situation but for the Rule. Because the Rule nullifies interests (would-be interests)
ab initio, the Rule does not effect a change from one existing distribution to another.
27. Leach, supra note 11, at 644 example 12.
1990] 713
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guage creating the preceding interest, that is, the nature of the
preceding interest. This large difference in result has been criti-
cized as unjustified by the small difference in language used.28
The parade of horrible results attributed to the Rule also
includes the unborn widow defect. Suppose that 0, intending
that Smith's wife, Grace, should take possession after Smith
dies, makes the following transfer.
Example 3: 0 devises the homestead "to Smith for life, then
to his widow for life, then to the children of Smith then
living."29
The final interest described may not vest in any child of Smith
until Smith's widow dies. Because Smith might marry a woman
born after O's death and she might die more than twenty-one
years after the deaths of everyone alive at the time of the trans-
fer, the Rule voids the interest in the children of Smith. If 0
uses "Grace" instead of "his widow," the interest in the children
is valid. This and other traps for the unwary have inspired crit-
ics to call for modification of the Rule.30
C. Calls for Reform
W. Barton Leach started the push for reform by proposing
28. Whether the criticism is well-founded depends upon factual issues. The critical
question is whether the small difference in language signals a large difference in intent. It
is, of course, always dangerous to speculate as to what a transferor would have wished had
she known that her intended transfer could not be achieved. Nevertheless, as evidenced by
the cy pres doctrine, courts often attempt to effectuate the closest permissible transfer to
that intended by the transferor. Presuming that a court is trying to follow the intent of the
transferor as closely as possible, the different results might be appropriate. The objective
ought to be to achieve what the transferor would have considered to be her second choice,
given that her first choice would not be allowed. Possibly, the transferor in Example I
considered the primary goal to be that of depriving A of the land when liquor is sold, and
her secondary goal, in the event of A's ouster, was to specify to whom the land should next
go. The Example 1 transferor, if told that her intent to put B in possession after A would
not be accomplished, would respond that she wanted A off the land in any event. The
transferor in Example 2 could well have considered the primary goal to be that of getting
the land into the hands of B upon the sale of liquor. A necessary consequence of that goal
would be that A would be deprived of the land, but that consequence was not an
independently desired goal. Upon being told that her primary goal would not be achieved,
the Example 2 transferor would respond that A should keep the land. There is no reason to
criticize the difference in results that obtain upon the usage of the two different forms of
language unless there is evidence that the two different results do not as a matter of fact
approximate the intended second choice of the transferor more closely than any other rule
with equally low costs of application. In short, the simple rule adopted by the courts could
be the best approximation that is easy to apply.
29. See Leach, supra note 11, at 644 example 12.
30. Critics using this example rarely admit even the possibility that 0 actually meant
what she said, that Smith's widow (whoever that might be) should take after Smith.
HeinOnline  -- 64 Tul. L. Rev. 714 1989-1990
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the wait-and-see approach,31 which he hoped would ameliorate
the harsh effects arising from the "abstruse" nature and "super-
fluous technicalities and complexities of the Rule' 32 without sac-
rificing "the general policy against withdrawal of property from
commerce." 33 Some states responded to the call for reform by
adopting a wait-and-see approach.34 Other states have adopted
more limited, piecemeal amendments aimed at eliminating some
of the traps for the unwary while leaving the common-law Rule
intact.35 While states have experimented with various revisions,
scholars have clashed over the period for determining violations
of the wait-and-see version of the Rule. For instance, Professor
Dukeminier advocates the variable common-law period, whereas
Professor Waggoner champions the fixed period embodied in the
Uniform Statute.36 Professor Fetters eschews wait-and-see, the
31. Under the traditional common-law Rule, an interest is void if, at the time the
creating instrument becomes effective, there is any possibility (no matter how unlikely) that
the interest might vest too late. Haskell, supra note 3, at 545. The wait-and-see approach is
a more forgiving test that does not invalidate the interest as long as it is still possible for it
to vest in time. This often leaves the status of a questionable provision in doubt for a
considerable time.
32. Leach, Reign of Terror, supra note 3, at 722-23.
33. Leach, supra note 11, at 640. Professor Simpson has expressed this policy
somewhat differently:
[A]nd in the eighteenth century this was well realized-so much so that lawyers
saw in all the rules directed against perpetuities a single policy and a single
principle-that the power to dispose of the fee simple in possession of a parcel of
land ought not to be put in abeyance for a longer period than was normal in the
traditional strict settlement, which is a period of a life in being plus twenty-one
years.
A. SIMPSON, supra note 4, at 216.
34. See generally Phelps v. Shropshire, 254 Miss. 777, 183 So. 2d 158 (1966);
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953); ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.27.010 (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.225(2)(a) (West Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 30, paras. 193 § 3, 195a § 5(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 381.216 (Baldwin 1979); NEv. REV. STAT. § 111.1031 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-1-
17.1 (Supp. 1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(c) (Baldwin Supp. 1987); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (Purdon 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (1984); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-13.3 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.130 (West Supp. 1987).
35. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2-.3 (McKinney 1967 & Supp.
1989) (eliminating fertile octogenarian, unborn widow, administrative contingencies, and
age contingencies traps); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.225(4)-(5) (West Supp. 1987)
(eliminating same traps); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 194(c)(l)-(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1989) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 45-96 (West 1981) (eliminating age contingencies
trap); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 102 (1988); MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-
103(b) (1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
36. See generally Dukeminier, A Final Comment by Professor Dukeminier, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1742 (1985); Dukeminier, A Response by Professor Dukeminier, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1730 (1985); Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1648 (1985); Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities:
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fixed period in gross, and other reform proposals that extend the
perpetuities period. Rather, he argues for a stricter Rule requir-
ing vesting in possession and the total elimination of extraneous
measuring lives.37 Finally, and in contrast, Professor Epstein
has recently weighed in with a radically unrestrictive approach
calling for total abolition of the Rule against Perpetuities, partly
on the ground that it is inefficient.38
Though their criticisms have merit, commentators advocat-
ing change have failed to inventory fully the benefits conferred
on society by the common-law Rule. The policy of guarding
against the removal of property from commerce, which Gray
identifies as the source of the Rule,39 is recognized frequently
and is reviewed again in the following section dealing with
improved resource allocation. Without attempting to decide the
efficiency of the Rule in its common-law form or otherwise, this
Article furthers the debate by elaborating the traditional justifi-
cation and by enumerating other items to be weighed in the eco-
nomic balance.
II. THREE WAYS IN WHICH THE RULE FACILITATES THE
USE AND ENJOYMENT OF RESOURCES
A. The First Benefit: Improved Resource Allocation
By reducing the barriers to exchange, the Rule against Per-
petuities increases the likelihood that assets will be put to their
most productive uses. The Rule permits hopeful buyers to
purchase land and other assets more easily by reducing the
number of owners and by putting interests in the hands of per-
sons who can sell their rights. Conversely, the Rule makes it
easier for persons holding rights in assets to sell their rights by
collecting the rights into packages that are more desirable to
buyers. By improving purchasability and marketability,1° the
Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1023, 1075 (1987) [hereinafter Ninety Years in
Limbo]; Waggoner, supra note 3; Waggoner, A Rejoinder by Professor Waggoner, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (1985); Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Perspective on Wait-and-See, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1714 (1985).
37. See Reply, supra note 3, at 388-407; see also Haskell, supra note 3, at 558-64.
38. Roundtable, supra note 3, at 842 ("It tends to queer all sorts of transactions, slow
people up, get them apprehensive and nervous for no particular gain. So strike the rule
down.").
39. See J. GRAY, supra note 1, § 119; Leach, supra note 11, at 640.
40. When people speak of purchasing Blackacre, they ordinarily mean to acquire all
of the privately held rights associated with Blackacre, i.e., a fee simple absolute. Therefore,
as used in this Article, "purchasability" refers to the ease with which a nonowner can
[Vol. 64716
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Rule facilitates the transfer of assets4 1 to persons that will put
the assets to their best use.
1. Division of Rights
The estate system divides rights in land along a temporal
dimension, from the infinite fee simple absolute to the short-term
leasehold. Covenants, equitable servitudes, easements, and prof-
its divide rights in land as to usage. Though the law fixes and
limits categories of rights into which divisions can be made, it
does permit extensive division of rights. As a result, what is
commonly identified as a single physical thing may be owned by
many persons.
In connection with such basic rights as the right to control
a particular use of land for a particular period of time, other
rights exist, including the rights to divide, sell, and give away the
basic rights.42 The law leaves most decisions as to whether and
acquire all the rights in a thing, or at least all the rights normally associated with the most
complete form of ownership recognized by our law. Purchasability is increased by
reducing the sum of the transaction costs of obtaining a fee simple absolute. By way of
contrast, alienability and marketability as used here are terms that take the seller's
standpoint instead of the buyer's. Alienability refers to the degree to which an owner of an
interest is limited by the law in the ways she can transfer or dispose of the interest. See J.
GRAY, supra note 1, at 3 ("[S]peaking accurately, a future interest does not render a
present interest inalienable. The present owner has less to convey than he would have if the
future interest did not exist; but all that he has he can convey freely."). Marketability, or
salability, refers to the degree to which an owner of an interest is limited by the market (the
desirability of the asset to others) in the ways she can transfer or the amount she can get for
the interest. See P. GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 474 (1984) (carefully distinguishing
marketability from alienability). The advantage of this lexicon is that the use of a single
term identifies the perspective (buyer's or seller's) and the source of the restraint on
acquisition or disposition (legal or market). If the Blackacre of Example 2 were completely
alienable by 0, the result of the conveyance would be a division of rights that would reduce
the purchasability of Blackacre which in turn would probably, but not necessarily, reduce
the marketability of A's determinable fee. For more on the connection between alienability
and marketability, see infra subpart II(D).
As the term is used here, the Rule does little today to improve alienability. In the past,
the Rule improved alienability by eliminating contingent interests which could not, as a
matter of law, be transferred inter vivos. But today, contingent interests can be sold in
most jurisdictions and, even in those states adhering to the common law, contingent
interests may be transferred (1) by release, (2) for valuable consideration in equity, and (3)
through the application of estoppel by warranty deed. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER,
PROPERTY 222 (2d ed. 1988).
41. In contrast to the meaning of "asset" in accounting, in which it includes money
and other intangibles, the word asset, in this Article, refers to physical things like land,
paintings, and factories.
42. These rights relate to the basic rights and, in a sense, rest one level above the basic
rights because they are rights about rights. A person who holds basic rights usually holds
the next level of rights as well, but transferors can use spendthrift trusts to create basic
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how rights will be divided and subdivided to the individual hold-
ers of those rights. The rights to divide and transfer are impor-
tant parts of our concept of private property. Because our
property system recognizes finely divided rights in things and
leaves decisions to subdivide to individual owners, a significant
legal potential exists for a broad spreading of rights in assets.
2. Reaggregation of Divided Rights
Broad dispersion of rights in a resource creates a problem
for persons whose intended use of that resource requires owner-
ship of all the rights. All else being equal, the more owners of
Blackacre, the more difficult it is to round up the interests. The
Rule makes assets more purchasable by reducing the number of
persons holding interests in the asset.
As seen above, the Rule redistributes rights from an
intended transferee to some other recipient, either a prior trans-
feree or the transferor. When the prior transferee receives the
redistributed rights, the application of the Rule against Perpetu-
ities always improves the purchasability of the resource by
reducing the number holding interests.43 In Example 2, for
instance, the Rule makes land easier to purchase because the
whole bundle of rights ends up in the hands of one person, A,
instead of two, A and B. Furthermore, this gain increases when
the void language of the instrument names multiple transfer-
ees.44 By eliminating a set of transferees, the Rule reduces the
negotiations needed to acquire Blackacre.45 While this benefit of
the Rule's operation is, in a sense, fortuitous because the Rule
does not invalidate all transfers to multiple transferees, the effect
ought to be counted among the benefits wrought by the Rule.
rights that are unaccompanied by the rights to sell and divide. See Alexander, The Dead
Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1197 n.19,
1202 (1985). The creation of marital and concurrent estates also generates rights to which
the right of alienation does not attach. See id. at 1205 (marital estate rights not alienable by
wife); see also Sawada v. Endo, 57 Haw. 608, 561 P.2d 1291 (1977) (rights under tenancy
by the entirety not alienable by husband).
43. Despite the mechanical nature of the Rule, a Rule violation may lead to litigation,
which could reduce purchasability until the court decides the case. But because a
prospective purchaser can, even during litigation, buy out the same parties asserting
interests as would have held interests in the absence of the Rule, litigation possibly will not
interfere with the purchase even temporarily.
44. Example 2a: 0 devises Blackacre "to A and his heirs, but if the premises shall be
used for the sale of liquors then to B's children and their heirs."
45. For further elaboration of some of the ways in which multiple parties make
transactions difficult, see, e.g., Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch and
Concern, 1988 DUKE L.J. 925, 936-37.
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That some transfers to multiple holders escape the Rule does not
diminish the benefits accruing when the Rule strikes others
down.
The application of the Rule to cases like Example 1, in con-
trast to those like Example 2, does not automatically reduce the
number of interest holders. In Example 1, both the recipient
and loser of the redistributed rights are single, not multiple, per-
sons. In such cases, the Rule merely substitutes one interest
holder for another. There are, however, cases similar to Exam-
ple 1 in the wording of the contingency, but different in number
of persons, some involving multiple transferees and some involv-
ing multiple recipients of the redistributed rights.
Example 4: 0 grants Blackacre "to A and his heirs so long as
no liquor or tobacco is sold on the premises, and in the event
liquor is sold then to B and his heirs, and in the event tobacco
is sold then to C and his heirs."
If, as in this example, the instrument specifies a group or a class
of transferees and the rights are redistributed from the group
back to the transferor or to a single successor, then the Rule
improves purchasability by reducing the rights holders with
whom a purchaser must negotiate. If, on the other hand, a will
specifies one remote transferee and the Rule redistributes the
rights to a group of successors of the transferor, the Rule oper-
ates to make the resource less purchasable by increasing the
holders. Whether, in redistributing interests back to the trans-
feror, the Rule tends more often to increase or decrease the size
of the group holding the rights is difficult to determine.46
Although the Rule might or might not improve
purchasability by redistributing rights from a transferee back to
the transferor, it always reduces the number of interest holders
when it redistributes rights to prior transferees. Thus the Rule
improves purchasability in some cases by reducing the number
of persons holding interests, which reduces the number of per-
46. Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950),
provides an example of the difficulties that can arise on both sides of the issue. Because the
court held the gift to be valid, the numerous successors to the 10 specified legatees owned
the land. Id. at 648, 91 N.E. 2d at 924. If the gift had been declared invalid under the
Rule, an even greater number of successors to the testatrix's 25 heirs would have taken.
Careful empirical study might reveal which effect is more common and the degree to
which purchasability is diminished in such situations. Without such study it is difficult to
tell whether the Rule increases or decreases the number of interest holders in cases when
the rights automatically return to the transferor. However, under a system of
primogeniture the Rule would usually result in improved purchasability in these situations.
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sons with whom a buyer must negotiate. Many scholars have
recognized this benefit in stating that the Rule improves
alienability.47
3. Giving Rights to Identifiable Persons
Another way the Rule improves purchasability is by taking
rights from the unborn and unidentifiable and giving them to
persons that are alive and ascertainable. The law does not limit
ownership to persons that can be identified. And, curiously
enough, it allows people that have not been born to hold impor-
tant rights. (Although these rights are contingent, no common-
law rule categorically prevents the unborn from holding prop-
erty interests.). Obviously, a purchaser can more easily acquire
a resource if she can identify all who hold outstanding interests
than if she cannot identify the holders. Likewise, the purchaser
has an easier time negotiating with living persons than persons
waiting to enter the world.48
The following example illustrates how the Rule improves
purchasability by redistributing rights to identifiable persons.
Example 5: 0 grants Blackacre "to A and his heirs so long as
no liquor is sold on the premises, and in the event liquor is sold
then to B's widower and his heirs."
Suppose X wishes to buy Blackacre after the transfer. Were it
not for the Rule, X would be unable to purchase the fee because
the contingent executory interest following A's fee simple is not
held by any identifiable person; B's widower cannot be ascer-
tained until B dies. The Rule saves the day by moving the rights
X hopes to purchase from B's widower to 0, who can be identi-
fied immediately. In such situations, the Rule improves
purchasability by redistributing rights from an unknown person
to an identifiable person with whom X can bargain. Although
the operation of the Rule in this case is fortuitous (since the
unidentifiability of B's widower is not the fundamental reason
that the Rule strikes down the interest), the Rule does improve
the situation in terms of purchasability. This class of improve-
ments should fall among the benefits of the Rule's operation.49
If, instead, the transfer above is made in a will rather than
47. But cf supra note 40 for the meaning of alienability as used in this Article.
48. This phrasing of the point is not intended to express any view on whether the
unborn and unconceived are persons for any other purposes.
49. The Rule can be especially helpful when it redistributes an interest from an
unidentifiable intended transferee to a prior transferee that is identifiable.
720 [Vol. 64
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inter vivos, the same benefits will accrue only sometimes.
Although the successor to O's interest may often be immediately
identifiable, such is not always the case. If O's will specifies a
particular person as the recipient of the residue, O's successor
can be identified at O's death and any of the Rule's redistribu-
tion to 0 will place the rights in an identifiable person. If the
residuary clause itself creates a future interest in an unidentifi-
able person, however, then only some of O's successors are iden-
tifiable at O's death.50 For example, the residue might be left to
"my wife for life, then to my friend B's widow," in which case B
is still alive. Nevertheless, the Rule will tend to improve matters
because the transfers from one unidentifiable person to another
will do no harm to purchasability, and the redistributions from
an unidentifiable person to someone who can be ascertained will
make the underlying resource more easily purchased.
Situations similar to Example 5 can also arise without a
condition precedent.
Example 6: 0 grants Blackacre "to X in trust to pay the
income to A for life, then to pay the income to the children of A
for their lives, then to be transferred to the children of such
children."'"
Here, too, the effect of the Rule is to redistribute rights from a
group of persons who are unidentifiable to a person that a hope-
ful purchaser might be able to locate. Yet this example illus-
trates another aspect of the Rule's redistributions as well. The
grandchildren of A are unidentifiable because they are not yet
alive. The Rule redistributes their interest to a person, 0, who is
alive. This aspect of the Rule's operation is not merely fortui-
tous. The Rule operates on the interest in the grandchildren
precisely because they might not become living beings for too
long a time.
Considering all the above cases together, the Rule improves
the purchasability of complete ownership in resources 52 when it
collects interests into fewer hands and when it redistributes
Example 5a: 0 devises Blackacre "to A and his heirs, but if the premises shall be
used for the sale of liquors then to B's widower and his heirs."
50. This analysis presumes that interests not effectively transferred because of the
Rule pass instead under a valid residuary clause.
51. See Leach, supra note 11, at 643 example 11.
52. "Resources" in this Article is synonymous with assets and denotes physical
things, such as land and factories. See supra note 41.
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interests to persons that can be identified and can speak and deal
for themselves.
4. Marketability
Improved purchasability should lead to better use of assets
because the person that can maximize use encounters fewer
transaction costs in buying the assets.5 3 That conclusion (that
the Rule furthers efficient allocation) does not, however, follow
automatically. The aggregation of rights may impede market
transfers because fee simple ownership is not always the best
grouping of rights. Though division reduces purchasability,
breaking rights into smaller packages can make the rights more
marketable, that is, capable of bringing a higher total price on
the market.5 4 Regarding land, whether a geographical division
(into smaller parcels) or a temporal division (into the various
"estates") or a usage division (e.g., into profits) increases or
decreases the total desirability of the sum of the interests in a
parcel depends on the best use or uses of the land. If the best use
of one quarter of a city block in Manhattan were high-rise, low-
income, residential apartments, then the market value of that
parcel, 55 before the apartments were built, might be decreased by
bundling it with the remaining three quarters of the block since
the resulting package might be priced beyond the means of the
most efficient developer of the quarter-block.5 6 Likewise, once
the low-income apartments were built, the market value of the
realty would be reduced if the fee could not be split into present
possessory terms of years followed by reversions. In this respect
53. This view is the conclusion reached with some hesitation in the Restatement:
"[T]he rule against perpetuities probably contributes to the increased use of the wealth of
society.. . . This it does by prohibiting those categories of future interests which would
make either impossible or improbable sales of land for long periods of time."
RESTATEMENT (DONATIVE TRANSFERS), supra note 3, at 9.
54. See supra note 40. Interests in land or other assets are more "marketable," as
used in this Article, when the interests are more desirable to prospective purchasers. If one
person would pay $10 for the mineral rights to Blackacre and another would pay $91 for all
of the rights to Blackacre except the mineral rights, and if no one would pay more than
$100 for complete title to Blackacre, then the divided rights to Blackacre are more
marketable than the fee. "Marketable" here does not carry with it any specific degree of
marketability, as it does in the marketable title context.
55. "Market value" of an asset, as used here, refers to the amount of dollars all the
rights in an asset would bring if offered for sale by the owner for a given period of time.
56. Less well-heeled buyers could purchase the whole parcel and divide the usage, but
the costs of those transactions decrease the amount they would be willing to pay for the
land itself. The quarter-block parcel is also less purchasable if it has already been broken
into smaller parcels held by different persons.
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determinable fees and life estates are not, as a matter of logic,
different from the term of years. Such divisions may increase
marketability by breaking ownership into present and future
interests, which are more desirable than the fee. Whether physi-
cal and temporal divisions will maximize the market value of a
resource depends upon the best use of the resource and the capi-
tal available to the best users.
Economically, the story told here is a simple one. Rights in
land and other assets are items (factors) of production and, like
any other items of production, those rights can be combined like
the bricks of a house to produce a larger item or divided like a
tree into toothpicks to produce smaller items. This act of pro-
duction (some products do sell at a loss) may make a product
that has more value than the sum of values of the inputs. The
production process here involves only legal labor, the collecting
or dividing of rights in a particular physical thing that already
exists.
Notwithstanding the possibility that the reaggregation of
rights may make the packages of rights less desirable, the Rule's
tendency to aggregate rights should lead to improved allocation
of assets for two reasons. First, the costs of disaggregation and
aggregation are asymmetrical. It is comparatively easy to divide
the bundle of rights if divided rights would generate more wealth
than would a single fee simple. Conversely, due to the problems
of locating multiple holders and the possibilities of strategic bar-
gaining such as holding out, it is much more costly to reaggre-
gate rights if a fee simple would generate more wealth. Since
private transactions are thus more difficult in one direction than
private transactions going the other way, the Rule can be
expected to reduce transaction costs by leaving the parties in the
position that is more easily changed (by private negotiations)
should such position turn out to be incorrect.
Second, there is empirical evidence that the packages of
rights resulting from the operation of the Rule are more desira-
ble to the market than the packages intended by the transferor.
By packaging rights more attractively, the Rule enhances the
likelihood that assets will be moved in the market to better uses.
Some evidence for this proposition that the Rule makes the
packages of rights more attractive to the market is discussed in
subpart D, below.
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B. The Second Benefit: Enhanced Enjoyment of Interests
Another economic gain flows from reaggregation of inter-
ests in assets. Collected rights may generate more enjoyment
than do divided rights. Consider the following example.
Example 7: 0 conveys Blackacre "to A and his heirs, but if
the price of soybeans drops below the current level then to B
and his heirs."
Assume that A gets fifty utils of happiness from ownership of the
determinable fee,57 but would get sixty from a fee simple, and
that B gets nine utils of happiness from ownership of the contin-
gent remainder. 8 The Rule accomplishes redistribution that
increases the enjoyment of the rights in Blackacre. The amount
of increase is limited by the amount the parties would have to
spend to arrange the same transfer privately, but those transac-
tion costs can be quite high.5 9 The enjoyment of the whole set of
rights is greater than the sum of the enjoyments of the subsets of
rights. The same example can illustrate, for comparison, the
improved allocation benefit. In addition suppose that someone
else, X, could make much better use of Blackacre than could
either A or B. By collecting the rights together, the Rule
increases the probability that X will be able to purchase Black-
acre and reallocate it to better use. Unlike improved allocation,
the enjoyability benefit accrues regardless of whether the redis-
tribution of rights actually increases the likelihood that the mar-
ket will switch the asset to a better use or to a more appreciative
user. 60 The Rule increases wealth by reducing risk. Subpart D,
below, presents some evidence that the aggregated rights are
57. The ways in which the contingency will affect the enjoyability of the defeasible
interest might depend on, among other things, the degree to which the contingency is
outside the control of the person holding the defeasible interest.
58. Readers that notice that B could sell his interest to A are urged to assume, in
addition, that the paperwork would amount to two utils.
59. One of the interest holders may have difficulty locating others (especially if they
are not yet alive), and bilateral monopoly problems may impede negotiations even when the
other party can be found.
60. The allocation and enjoyment benefits may seem to be one and the same, but they
should be considered separately. The second benefit, enhanced enjoyment, can be recast as
an improved allocation of rights from one person to a more appreciative person. However,
to describe it thus would lead to confusion with the first benefit, which relates to improved
allocation of the assets themselves, rather than the rights. The Rule improves the
allocation of resources by collecting rights into bundles that move easily from the grantees
to other persons that have a better use for the assets. If the collected rights to the asset are
not purchased by someone else, the improved transferability yields no actual gain in
resource allocation. In addition to easing the transfer to persons other than the grantees,
the Rule improves the enjoyment of assets by the grantees themselves by collecting rights
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more enjoyable than the disaggregated rights upon which the
Rule operates.
C. A Darwinian Reason to Doubt the Efficiency of Donative
Distributions
Why would a grantor knowingly reduce the value derived
from an asset by its holders? Arguably, any sensible donor
would wish to maximize the value of the asset in the hands of
her transferees and would therefore avoid any suboptimal divi-
sions of rights.61 If that claim is generally correct, the law
should uphold grantor intent on the presumption that grantors
attempt to maximize value and that courts will do no better.
Some market evidence against this argument is presented below,
but the empirical evidence may make more sense if preceded by
a theoretical reason to doubt the presumption. The theoretical
reason offered here is based on the distinction between altruism
and selfishness. Briefly, evolutionary theory explains how
behaviors that appear to be altruistic may instead be self-serving
from a genetic point of view. To the extent that donative trans-
fers result from a naturally selected helping gene rather than
true altruism, the presumption that donors maximize their own
utility by maximizing that of their donees is undermined.
There is no claim here that a donor's inclination to help
others stems primarily from her genes. In comparison to the
forces of education and socialization, genetic proclivities might
account for only a tiny portion of what we see as altruism. By
explaining why behaviors appearing to be grounded in altruism
might not be, however, the analysis that follows offers a reason
to question the assumption that a donor's assets will be divided
among recipients so as to maximize the total value to the group
of donees.62
Donative behaviors, like other helping behaviors, seem eco-
nomically irrational because they fail to maximize the giver's
into more enjoyable bundles. Usually the two benefits will go hand in hand, but for an
example when they do not, see the discussion of trusts infra subpart II(G)(1).
61. The division might be optimal once the donor's enjoyment is factored into the
equation. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. The purpose here is to explore
that preference from the sociobiology perspective.
62. The discussion here relates to what one might call the true cause of the donative
behavior or proclivity, not the thoughts or reasons running through the head of the donor.
More specifically, this Article in no way attempts to discuss or determine what thoughts
accompany or precede apparently altruistic behavior. The mentalistic reasons in the minds
of most or all donors are irrelevant to this discussion.
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wealth or physical well-being. Richard Dawkins (among others)
has explained apparent altruism in the biological context as
behavior that is selfish from a genetic point of view.63 Successful
genes perpetuate themselves. 64 A gene can do this by replicating
itself in the next generation of offspring. A gene can also perpet-
uate itself by saving the life of the same gene in another being,
such as an identical-twin sibling. In terms of a gene's survival, it
is beneficial for the gene to cause its host to risk anything less
than a certainty of death to save the life of the host's identical
twin. A gene that predisposes its carrier to a mild degree of self-
sacrifice for an identical twin will have an advantage that makes
it more numerous in the population and will be, therefore, a bet-
ter survivor than a gene that does not include such a
predilection.
Genetically beneficial self-sacrifice need not limit itself to
helping identical-twin siblings. Genes in mothers, for example,
will tend to be more plentiful in the next generation if they cause
their hostess to make some sacrifice for her offspring. Too much
sacrifice would reduce the chances of gene survival, but some
sacrifice will increase gene numerosity. How much sacrifice is
genetically appropriate depends upon, among other things, the
degree of relatedness of the recipient of the help. Because the
chances of a gene of the mother's appearing in the offspring are
one out of two, the gene should not cause its hostess to risk more
than a fifty percent chance of death to save the life of one descen-
dant.65 Any gene carrying a higher proclivity for helping behav-
ior while the mother is stif able to produce offspring will tend,
over time, to be eliminated from the gene pool. Similarly, sec-
ond generation descendants are each only worth a twenty-five
percent chance of death.66 This analysis can be applied to any
degree of relatedness to determine the maximum level of risk
63. R. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 4-7, 95-116 (1976); see also J. BROWN,
HELPING AND COMMUNAL BREEDING IN BIRDS: ECOLOGY AND EVOLUTION ch. 4
(1987). Selfish behavior is, in this view, behavior that redounds to the benefit of the actor
(or would have a positive expected value from an ex ante perspective), regardless of the
character of the actor's reasoning or even the existence of any reasoning.
64. Dawkins uses "gene" to refer to all copies of a replicating DNA molecule. R.
DAWKINS, supra note 63, at 37. It is hoped that the looser use here will aid readability.
65. Fifty percent is the largest chance of death that ought be taken by a fertile
mother. If the offspring might not survive without the mother or if the offspring might not
survive to the age necessary to reproduce, the largest tolerable chance of death is even
lower. On the other hand, if the mother is beyond the reproductive age, the mother can
sensibly (genetically speaking) take risks larger than 50%.
66. The grandchild would be worth more if the grandparent is close to death anyway.
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acceptable to the helper.67
The preceding explanation employs examples of the most
extreme sort, ones involving high probabilities of death. The
genetic view applies also to helping behaviors of less dire conse-
quence. Jerrome Brown demonstrates how a gene causing
female stripe-backed wrens to stay at home for a year to help
their father and stepmother raise their next clutch could result in
greater "fitness" than a gene causing them to breed a clutch of
their own.68 We need not attribute the observed helping behav-
ior of such birds to altruistic thoughts on the part of the birds.
The wrens help because they are built from a gene that carries a
helping behavioral strategy. 9
The discussion above shows the theoretical possibility of
nature selecting in favor of helping genotypes. It is also reason-
able to believe that such selection has occurred in the human
gene pool. If it has, such a genetic proclivity could well manifest
itself as donative behavior. If a helping genotype were to show
itself through donative behavior, what pattern of donative trans-
fers would be expected?
Before answering that question, it might be best to answer
the objection that donative transfers are not similar to the sacrifi-
cial helping behaviors favored by natural selection. Donative
behavior does not usually involve the same degree of sacrifice as
in the case of wrens choosing to help rather than mate, for exam-
ple. Indeed, a testamentary disposition involves no sacrifice for
the donor at all; it is a little too late to do anything to increase
her chances of reproduction. The point, however, is not that
humans contain a gene that causes them to make out wills in
certain ways. Far too few generations have passed for nature to
67. Quickly the analysis gets complicated. It makes no genetic sense, for example, for
a mother to sacrifice herself to save her offspring if the offspring are too immature to
survive without her. Therefore, the likelihood of the offspring surviving to produce a
second generation of offspring must be included as a factor in determining the degree of
sacrifice that is genetically appropriate.
Similarly, it would be counterproductive for a gene to cause its host to sacrifice for the
host's parents if the parents are beyond the reproductive years and the host is capable of
reproduction. Moreover, without the aid of modem science, a gene can never be sure that
another body holds the same gene. Nonetheless, mothers and, to a lesser degree, fathers
can be fairly sure that certain individuals are their offspring. Like mothers, older siblings
witnessing the birth of younger siblings can be reasonably sure of their relatedness. The
appropriate degree of sacrifice depends on the degree of confidence in relatedness as well as
the degree of relatedness.
68. J. BROWN, supra note 63, at 53-54.
69. "Behavioral strategy" should not be read to mean that the individual wren has
thoughts that would qualify as what we think of as a strategy.
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have selected that specific behavioral strategy.70 The helping
genotype suggested here does not focus on any particular kind of
helping behavior; it is much more generalized. Rather, the gene
tells its host to give help and aid as the situation requires.
Although such a genotype might have been selected in the con-
text of many decisions involving substantial self-sacrifice, the ele-
ment of large sacrifice need not be present for the helping urge to
swell.7'
In what pattern of transfers might a helping genotype show
itself? First of all, a gene for helping that had survived natural
selection would likely be one that tends to prefer closer relatives,
such as parents and children, to more distant kin, such as grand-
parents and grandchildren. Such a gene should also be one that
tends to prefer younger recipients to those that have passed their
reproductive years, for example, children over siblings and
grandchildren over grandparents. In other words, an evolution-
ary model of donative transfers would predict a general prefer-
ence for closer and younger relatives.
One might ask why it would-not be best for one's genes to
leave all wealth to the most closely related person, or group of
persons, rather than spreading the wealth to a broader network
of relatives, as often happens. The rational gene could respond
that the apparently altruistic act has a diminishing marginal util-
ity to the donee. At some point, additional beneficence will
improve the chances of survival of the genes in that recipient
significantly less than the same wealth would improve the
chances of survival of the genes of a less related person. Because
there is a smaller chance that the gene in question exists in the
less related person, the amount of survival benefit has to be
reciprocally larger for the donation to the less related person to
improve survival of the gene. If, for example, a $1000 gift would
improve the lot of a child of the transferor by eight utils, then
the transferor should choose to give to a grandchild only if the
utility to the grandchild would be greater than sixteen utils since
the child is twice as likely to have the gene carrying the helping
behavioral stragegy.72 Nevertheless, as long as the marginal sur-
70. A behavioral strategy here includes no component of conscious planning. See
supra notes 62 & 69. A behavioral strategy is a genetic proclivity toward a certain type of
behavior, with or without any accompanying thought.
71. Indeed, as the discussion above suggests, a finely tuned helping gene would cause
its host to engage in more help if the sacrifice were low.
72. Of course, any well-selected gene will also account for the factors mentioned
supra note 67. The important criterion might be expressed as the expected genetic utility of
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vival utility of money diminishes, there will always be a point at
which it does one's genes more good to stop giving to the closer
generation and start giving to the more distant.73
Donors should therefore be expected to favor more closely
related beneficiaries. Yet, because the marginal utility of income
diminishes,74 very wealthy transferors should also be expected to
wish to spread their gifts out some distance into the future.
Once the transferor has settled a million or two on a child, fur-
ther beneficence is unlikely to result in greater likelihood of sur-
vival of her genes. The next million will do more good for her
genes if she donates to her grandchildren, even though they are
more distantly related. It is likewise with further generations.
Therefore, for the very wealthy, it is genetically natural to
attempt to provide life sustaining wealth to distant, unborn
descendants and other gene carriers.76
The question of when it becomes genetically beneficial to
shift the focus of donation to the next generation is further com-
plicated by the incapacity of minors. Because he might spend
the money foolishly, it may often be better for the survival of a
the gift, which would be defined as the utility of the gift to the recipient (in terms of
enhancing the recipient's chances of producing offspring and raising them to maturity)
multiplied by the likelihood that the recipient carries any particular gene of the donor (as
adjusted for the confidence that the recipient is indeed related as supposed).
The apparently greater distribution of gifts to children than to siblings, two groups
that have the same chance of carrying the donor's helping gene, can be explained by
reference to the critical fact that one's siblings are much more likely than one's children to
be beyond the childbearing age and thus unable to help replicate the gene carrying the
helping behavior. The structure of the income and death tax laws also adds incentives for
some to pass assets down to the next generation, but such laws cannot explain the behavior
of persons whose assets are too meager to reach the taxable level.
73. That there is such a point does not mean that all, or even many, of us will achieve
enough wealth to reach it.
74. There is a large body of literature on this point. See generally, e.g., Bailey, Olson
& Wonnacott, The Marginal Utility of Income Does Not Increase: Borrowing, Lending, and
Friedman-Savage Gambles, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 372 (1980); Friedman & Savage, The
Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279 (1948). This Article
assumes those arguing that marginal utility of income declines have the better of the
argument.
75. This theory does not, however, support all grantors' attempts to constrain the
ways remote grantees use their assets.
76. This argument suggests an empirical study. One could examine wills probated to
determine whether gifts to related individuals varied in size as would be predicted by
genetic relatedness combined with an assumption that the marginal utility of gifts to the
recipients declines. In addition, one might be able to determine the points at which donors
tend to switch from one donee to another. To test the diminishing marginal utility
hypothesis more particularly, the study might attempt to match wills on all criteria except
wealth of donees. If perceived marginal utility diminishes, the donors should tend to
spread the wealth among fewer recipients if the recipients are poor.
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minor (and his ancestor's genes) to give money to his parent
with precatory language and a hope that the parent will spend it
for the benefit of the child rather than to give it to him directly.77
Eventually, however, as the amount of money increases, addi-
tional amounts given to the parent will do little good, whether or
not the parent heeds the donor's wishes, and the donor should at
that point choose to give further amounts of money to the minor
(via a trust if necessary) to account for the chance that the par-
ent will not heed the precatory utterance.
The most obvious conclusion from this genetic analysis is
that donations are not necessarily tailored to achieve an optimal
distribution of rights from the societal point of view. Some
might say that it is obvious, without any theoretical analysis,
that donations do not maximize societal benefits. But such a
statement depends on a willingness to make interpersonal com-
parisons of utility. The theoretical point made here offers a rea-
son to question the donor's distribution of rights that does not
depend on any presumption regarding interpersonal utilities.
The more subtle conclusion to be drawn from the genetic
analysis is that, even if consideration is limited to the subset of
society chosen by the donor, the distribution of rights chosen by
the grantor will not maximize the welfare of the grantees.
Rather, the donor's intended distribution will maximize the ben-
efit to the donor's genes.78 If the historical environment has
selected in favor of a helping genotype in humans, we can expect
the helping behaviors resulting from that genotype to be distrib-
uted in accordance with the genetic relatedness of the recipients
to the helper.
Of course, not all donations stem from selfish motivations,
genetic or otherwise. The point is not that biology is or ought to
be the whole story. Gifts can be explained by a mentalistic refer-
ence to the donor's thoughts. Yet gifts can also be explained, in
part, by reference to a gene for helping, and the evolutionary
perspective provides one model for predicting the pattern of
donative transfers. By offering an alternative to the simpler util-
ity-from-helping-others model, the evolutionary model of activi-
77. Another reason to give money to the parent instead of an unborn child relates to
the financial strategies of trustees. Because trustees have less incentive to maximize the
return on a investment and because they operate under legal duties that may interfere with
maximization, a gift via a parent possibly will grow more than one in trust.
78. More precisely, the distribution should maximize the benefit to the gene or genes
carrying the proclivity to helping behavior.
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ties that appear to work to the detriment of the actor and to the
benefit of others casts large doubt on the presumption that the
donor designs a donative transfer so as to maximize the welfare
of others. To whatever degree helping behavior stems from
genetic behavioral strategies, we should not assume that helping
decisions made by transferors are the best distributions of rights
within society or even within the group identified by the helper
as objects of her charity.
Even allowing that the transferor's genetic inclination could
deviate from society's and the heirs' needs, an economist might
respond to this point by noting that in a market free of monop-
oly or externality problems, private exchanges can correct this
genetic misdirection. The argument would be that if the imme-
diate grantees (or any others) value the rights granted by the
donor to the remote grantees more highly than do those remote
grantees, they can pay the donor to alter her disposition.79 The
nature of a perpetuity, however, usually prevents this market
solution.
Violations of the Rule often occur in wills. When, as is
often the case, testators keep their dispositions secret from the
beneficiaries, the information costs confronting the immediate
grantees are practically insurmountable. If grantees do not
know of the will, they cannot negotiate to have it changed. Even
if immediate grantees know the terms of the will, the contingent
nature of the will makes its alteration by mutual agreement a bit
difficult. The grantees will not wish to pay for changes that can
be undone (or made pointless) by a subsequent will and the gran-
tor will often not wish to sell her right to change her mind, one
of the attractive features of a will. These problems can be over-
come with a contingent agreement, but the need for and expense
of such an agreement throw more transaction costs in the way of
a market solution. It seems unlikely that the assets held by per-
sons of moderate means would justify the transaction costs of
the mutually negotiated solution. 0
For those donors holding assets for which the transaction
costs would be relatively small, mostly the wealthy donors, a
different problem impedes the market solution. The donors
79. There may be a monopoly problem. Often the donor is the only potential source
for the future interest the donee hopes to obtain.
80. The information costs alone may be prohibitive if the parties do not know it
would be possible to draft an instrument that transfers title as of the death of the donor, as
would a will, but which the donor cannot change during her life.
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motivated by a genetic proclivity to create interests in remote
heirs may have little use for more money other than to give it
away. Without the freedom to dispose of it as they wish, they
may not value money. Therefore, offers of monetary compensa-
tion for changing the disposition will fall on deaf ears. Take the
simple example of a donor who wishes to leave all her millions to
two grantees, one immediate and one remote. Because of the
donor's wealth, all the compensation offered by the immediate
grantee would flow to the beneficiaries under the donor's will. If
the donor accepts the immediate grantee's offer of $1,000,000 to
eliminate the remote beneficiary, she gets nothing and the imme-
diate beneficiary loses nothing, in that he gets it all back when
she dies. This admittedly extreme example illustrates a major
difficulty confronting grantees wishing to eliminate other takers
under a will or an inter vivos gift from a wealthy donor. These
impediments to market solutions make it inappropriate to con-
clude from the absence of a market redistribution of rights that
the donor's distribution is efficient.81
. Market Evidence Indicating Enhancement of Marketability
and Enjoyability
Under the conventional criticism that legal contingent
interests impede marketability lies the assumption that the sum
of the values of the contingent and vested interests in Blackacre
is lower than the value of a fee simple in Blackacre. 2 From this
we can conclude that, at least in the experience of those who
write about the Rule, the combination of a contingent future
interest and a vested estate differs critically from a reversion fol-
lowing a leasehold in that the contingent interest package is less
desirable. Some evidence supports this conventional wisdom.
81. The immediate grantee may offer goods or services to the donor that she could
not get elsewhere. He might offer to go to law school, for example, in return for the
elimination of the remote beneficiary's interest. There are, however, impediments to this
private negotiation as well. The immediate grantee might be afraid that if he suggests such
an exchange, the donor will reverse the tables and require that he go to law school to get
the immediate interest. Nevertheless, there may be some situations in which the immediate
beneficiary is able to negotiate the transfer of a complete interest.
82. In this Article, the value of a bundle of rights (an interest) in an asset refers to the
currently realized value to the holder. In other words, it is the cash amount one would
have to pay the holder of that bundle in order to take away the bundle without his
complaint. "Value" thus used is idiosyncratic, particular to the person holding the rights
being valued. Because many of the rights important to this Article are themselves
contingent or risky, the term value when applied to those rights or interests necessarily
incorporates the risk aversion of the holder.
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Contingent interests rarely arise out of mutual bargains. If
vested-estate-plus-contingent-interest combinations were the
most efficient division of rights, we should see reported cases in
which the contingent combination was created in a market
exchange, one person buying a possibility of gaining possession
and the other suffering the possibility of losing possession, with
monetary compensation flowing from the former to the latter.
But the market rarely creates such combinations.83 At the very
least, market transactions eliminate many more contingent inter-
ests than they create, indicating that such interests more often
decrease than increase the value of land.84
83. Little empirical research exists on whether any transferee ever pays a transferor
to create a contingent future interest other than an option. A preliminary attempt to
survey practitioners was terminated after the first five Indianapolis lawyers, who were
questioned by telephone, responded that they had never seen such an interest and hinted
that the very search for such interests was a waste of time. The Restatement's treatment of
the subject also offers some indirect support for the conclusion that interests that violate the
Rule tend to be created in gifts. Though Professor Casner (the reporter for the
Restatement) acknowledges appropriately that the Rule applies also to commercially
created future interests, the extensive discussion of the Rule against Perpetuities doctrine
can be found under the heading of "Donative Transfers." RESTATEMENT (DONATIVE
TRANSFERS), supra note 3, at 1.
One might expect that a case involving a contingent interest that was created at the
request of a purchaser would be interesting enough to merit treatment in Property
casebooks, yet none appears in the future interest cases in most casebooks. See 1 R.
AIGLER, H. BIGELOW & R. POWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 922-41 (2d ed. 1951); 0. BROWDER, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 249-55 (4th ed.
1984); J. BRUCE, J. ELY & C. BOSTICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY
LAW 305-06 (1984); A. CASNER & W. LEACH, supra note 17, at 326-57; R. CHUSED, A
MODERN APPROACH TO PROPERTY 704-18 (1978); J. CRIBBET, W. FRITZ & C. JOHNSON,
CASES AND MATERIAL ON PROPERTY 55-59, 76, 79-81 (3d ed. 1972); J. CRIBBET & C.
JOHNSON, PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS 290-98 (1984); C. DONAHUE, JR., T.
KAUPER & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIAL ON PROPERTY 529-39 (2d ed. 1983); J.
DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 40, at 215-16, 222, 240-50; P. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 40, at 530-47; A. GULLIVER, E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A. MURPHY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 748-55 (1967); C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN,
PROPERTY AND LAW 495-502 (2d ed. 1985); S. KURTZ & H. HOVENKAMP, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 303-09 (1987); E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS
OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 228-78 (2d ed. 1974); J. WINOKUR, AMERICAN
PROPERTY LAW 163-69, 184-85 (1982).
84. For purposes of this Article, the value of an asset is the sum of the amounts all
holders of rights in that asset would have to be paid for society to take their rights without
their complaint (to an economist this amount is the sum of the individuals' equivalent
variations). Under this definition, the value of an asset identifies the societal wealth
attributable to that material thing. See also infra note 92.
The Restatement recognizes the reduction of value occurring upon division of rights,
but then takes that fact in a different direction, using it to support the conclusion that the
Rule aids current owners:
The division of ownership into successive interests tends to lessen the sum
realizable upon a sale of the separate interests, and thus diminishes the total
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It is possible that divisions into combinations of vested and
contingent interests maximize value but bargaining problems
prevent the market from making such allocations. Bargaining
problems do present difficulties. It would be hard for the group
of persons that might become Smith's heir to get together to buy
an interest and to agree upon the amount each would contribute
to the purchase price. It is harder yet for unborn persons to
negotiate for an interest. Thus bargaining problems seem an
adequate explanation for market transactions not creating inter-
ests in unidentified persons. Yet bargaining hurdles fail to
explain why market transactions so rarely create interests that
are contingent solely because they are subject to a condition pre-
cedent. If such interests are worthwhile,8 5 one would expect to
see them created in market transactions.8 6  Instead, they are
quite hard to find.87 This absence of examples suggests that the
purchasing power of the wealth represented by the thing in which such divided
interests have been created. To whatever extent such diminution occurs, the
responsiveness of these assets to the needs of their current owners is diminished.
RESTATEMENT (DONATIVE TRANSFERS), supra note 3, at 9. Contingent interest holders
are often given no compensation for the loss of their interest, indicating that the law assigns
no value to such interests. See L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
119 (2d ed. 1966); Browder, The Condemnation of Future Interests, 48 VA. L. REV. 461,
472 (1962); Stoyles, Condemnation of Future Interests, 43 IowA L. REV. 241, 247 (1958);
The Value of Possibilities of Reverter and Powers of Termination in Eminent Domain, 1963
ILL. L.F. 693; Comment, The Effect of Condemnation Proceedings upon Possibilities of
Reverter and Powers of Termination, 38 U. DET. L.J. 46, 47 (1960); Note, Eminent
Domain: Fee Simple Determinable and Possibility of Reverter: Distribution of Award:
Chew v. Commonwealth, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 631 (1961). But see United States v. 2184.81
Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 681 (W.D. Ark. 1942); Ink v. City of Canton, 4 Ohio St. 2d 51,
212 N.E.2d 574 (1965); Chew v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 307, 161 A.2d 621 (1960).
85. "'Worthwhile" here means that the division into present and future interests
increases the value of a piece of land or other asset.
86. Many contingent interests of the type stricken by the Rule may be created in
market transactions, but they remain undiscovered because cases involving such interests
never reach the courts of appeals. However possible, it seems unlikely that disputes
involving such interests would be so consistently free from appealable issues.
87. See supra note 83. "In this country, there appears to be no established,
conventional, commercial market for the purchase and sale of future interests," Reply,
supra note 3, at 385 n.23, much less such a market for contingent future interests, not to
mention a market for the creation of contingent interests. Careful study of the English
future interests market might reveal the degree of discount attributable to the risk factor
that accompanies contingent interests. The development of a market in contingent interests
may be prevented by buyers' suspicions that sellers have control over or knowledge of the
critical conditions precedent.
The buyer of an ordinary option to purchase land does not create a risky contingent
interest because the condition precedent to the transfer of rights is wholly within his
control. The purchase of the option may be a gamble (more likely a hedge), but whether
rights pass to him or not depends ultimately only upon his own election, not fate. The
purchaser of an option might use the option as a means to capture the positive externalities
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donative creation of contingent interests tends to reduce the
value of assets.
E. Two Possible Counterexamples from the Market
One might argue that the popularities of casualty insurance
and gambling show that contingent interests are worthwhile.
Neither example, however, compels the conclusion that the sorts
of contingent interests stricken down by the Rule are desirable.
1. Casualty Insurance
Although buyers in market exchanges infrequently create
contingent interests in land or other resources, they often create
contingent future interests in money. In casualty insurance con-
tracts, for example, two persons voluntarily create a contingent
future interest in cash. Why should this not be taken as conclu-
sive evidence that the creation of contingent interests in an asset
can increase its value? Unlike contingent interests, which create
possibilities of loss where none need exist, casualty insurance
merely transfers risk; it does not increase risk.88
Indeed, the popularity of casualty insurance confirms the
hypothesis that the creation of contingent interests is harmful.
In a contract of insurance, the insured purchases a contingent
interest in money, the condition precedent to which is an event
that causes a loss to the insured. The insured attempts to com-
bine the payoffs associated with the event in such a way that
substantial variations in his income are prevented. 9 Insurance
enhances certainty and stability for the insured. Thus the exam-
ple of insurance supports the notion that, unless the contingency
is specifically designed to counteract some other fortuity, a con-
tingent interest will by decreasing certainty also decrease value.
of his development upon adjoining lands. In that way, an option in gross eliminates
disincentives to development, contrary to the position taken by Leach, supra note 11, at
661. The seller of the option, on the other hand, does create a possibility of losing an
important asset. But there is an important difference from the possibilities of loss
associated with the usual form of defeasible interest. Unlike the holder of the defeasible
interest, the seller of the option is compensated for the loss of the land, if and when it
occurs, by the amount of the agreed purchase price. The optionor does not risk losing the
entire value of the asset upon the event terminating his interest.
88. The legal prerequisite to an insurance contract that the insured have an insurable
interest ensures that the contract exchanges risk rather than increasing risk.
89. Options to purchase land, stocks, foreign currencies, and commodities operate to
spread and reduce risks associated with future events in much the same fashion as
insurance. Purchases of outstanding contingent interests, to obtain a fee, also reduce risks
and, therefore, do not undermine the proposition that contingent interests reduce value.
1990] 735
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There are, of course, two parties to an insurance contract.
While the insured decreases risk by the contract, the insurer
increases the number of risks it bears. Obviously, neither the
probability nor the magnitude of loss decreases upon the transfer
of risk to the insurance company.90 The negative expected
return of that risk remains the same. The risk is less obnoxious
to the insurer at least in part because it has a greater endow-
ment; for the insurer the loss is only a drop in the bucket.91
2. Gambles
Many people, like insurance companies, take small gambles.
They buy lottery tickets or play roulette or slot machines. This
ordinary gambling, unlike the insurance hedge for the insured,
does increase risk and uncertainty. But most adults, like insur-
ance companies, do not risk a substantial portion of their
wealth 92 on one event.93 In fact, many of those who play lotter-
ies also insure their cars and houses. 94 The possibility of a rela-
90. The existence of insurance may actually increase the probability of loss. For a
discussion of this moral hazard problem and some ways to deal with it, see R. COOTER &
T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS ch. 2 app. (1988).
91. Economists often explain the willingness of insurers to take on the risks of others
by reference to the law of large numbers. By pooling the risks of a broad sample
population, the story goes, the risk becomes more certain and more certainly centered on
the true population mean.
92. In this Article, a person's wealth is the amounts he would have to be paid in
exchange for all his rights in assets, to acquire those rights without his complaint, and his
money.
93. The oft heard phrase, "I wouldn't bet the farm on it," expresses the notion that
acceptable odds become unacceptable as the amount at risk increases.
94. Friedman and Savage explain this fact with the hypothesis that the utility of
income function is both concave and convex. Friedman & Savage, supra note 74, at 287-97.
If marginal utility of income declines, a mathematically fair gamble will always have a
negative expected utility. Therefore, they concluded, marginal utility must sometimes
increase. Others dispute the conclusion that marginal utility of income increases. Bailey,
Olson & Wonnacott, supra note 74, at 372; see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 11 (3d ed. 1986). That many persons play lotteries when the expected return is
negative could be explained in at least four other ways. First, players might buy hope.
(Are lotteries a modern opiate of the masses?). Second, the stimulation associated with
small doses of uncertainty is itself worth buying. Third, as in the Friday night poker game,
the costs of small uncertainties are outweighed by the benefits of the larger enterprise
(sport) within which the gambling occurs. See generally R. HERMAN, GAMBLERS AND
GAMBLING (1976) (classifying gambling into four types, only one of which attributes
benefits to the risk itself). Fourth, classical conditioning studies in behavioral psychology
suggest that gambling behavior acquired under a random, intermittent reinforcement
schedule that appeared to reflect a positive expected return will be difficult to extinguish
even after it should be clear the expected return is negative. Fifth, and closely tied to
number four, people may become addicted to gambling. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1989, at 1,
col. 1.
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tively small decrease in endowment is acceptable, but the
possibility of a large decrease causes much uneasiness.9 5  Once
the amount in jeopardy causes enough discomfort, a person will
pay to be free of the possibility of loss. And one for whom the
amount of loss is small enough will gladly take payment to
assume the risk. Whenever a possible negative change in income
would matter a great amount to one person and less to another,
the former should be willing to pay the latter to bear the- risk of
that change.
The question for future interests is whether they generate
the sorts of anxieties against which people prefer to insure or the
sorts of excitement for which people will pay. Some contingent
interests voided by the Rule would be held by persons who
would enjoy holding their interests just as bettors enjoy holding
lottery tickets. On the other hand, some contingent interests
voided by the Rule would be held by persons that do not enjoy
the risky nature of the asset.96 The holders of the contingent
interests are, however, only one part of the story. In creating
future interests that are contingent by reason of a condition pre-
cedent, transferors also create defeasible estates. 97 These defeasi-
ble estates may make up a large part of the recipients' financial
endowments. 98 The more important the asset to the recipient,
the more likely the possibility of losing it exceeds the recipient's
threshold of discomfort. Thus the pervasiveness of gambling
does not undermine the conclusion reached above from the rar-
ity of market creations of contingent future interests: when
95. If marginal utility of income declines, the loss of a large asset will always result in
a disproportionately greater decrease in happiness than the loss of a small asset. In other
words, declining marginal utility explains why a person would insure against the possibility
of loss of large assets but not against the possibility of loss of small assets. See R. POSNER,
supra note 94, at 11.
96. This is not to say that the transferee is worse off as a result of the transfer. The
transferee's risk aversion may reduce the value of the interest, but probably not below zero.
97. See Example 2, supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. By creating the
contingent interest in B, 0 makes A's estate defeasible. Of course, one could create a
contingent future interest without making the previous interest defeasible, but to do so will
mean that some other interest becomes defeasible. For example, if 0 transfers "to A for
life, then to B and his heirs if he reaches 21," 0 creates a life estate in A followed by a
contingent remainder in fee simple in B. O's creation of B's interest does not detrimentally
affect A, but it does detrimentally affect the successor to O's interest because what would
have been a reversion in 0 that would automatically follow .4's death becomes a reversion
that is, in effect, defeasible. (That does not, however, make the reversion subject to the
Rule.) The creation of any contingent interest will necessarily leave in a state of doubt the
complementary interest as well.
98. For purposes of this Article, a person's "endowment" is defined as the set of
rights in assets and money held by the person. Endowment is the same as riches or means.
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transferors carve-contingent future interests and complementary
defeasible estates out of important real and personal assets, the
resulting uncertainties and attendant anxieties probably reduce
the societal wealth99 attributable to the underlying asset. 1°°
Even if one assumes the existence of gambling indicates that
the creation of contingent interests sometimes increases the
value of large assets, that example offers little support for the
conclusion that the creation of the type of contingent interests
invalidated by the Rule against Perpetuities similarly increases
wealth. The contingent interests created by gamblers will vest or
fail in a short time, and usually on or before a known date. Few
make bets that might not be resolved within their expected life-
times. Even gamblers want to know when they will learn
whether they have lost or won the bet. By contrast, the Rule
strikes down interests that might remain contingent for a long,
long time. Because market transactions rarely create contingent
99. "Wealth," when used in this Article without qualifier or in conjunction with
"societal," refers to the sum of the values of all assets held by society. See supra note 82
(definition of value). This meaning adopts the second half of the definition of wealth that
Judge Posner adopted. For him, wealth "is measured by what people are willing to pay for
something or, if they already own it, what they demand in money to give it up." Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979). Because
Posner's definition of wealth values assets according to what anyone would pay for them, a
mere exchange, although beneficial to both parties, does not increase wealth unless the act
of exchange increases (by wealth effects or otherwise) someone's valuation of at least one of
the assets exchanged. But see id. at 120. The thesis of this Article calls for a term that
reflects improvements in societal well-being due to beneficial redistributions of rights in
things. The meaning given wealth here captures that concept without stretching too far the
ordinary sense of the term. Because individual wealth includes money and social wealth
does not, see supra note 92, the sum of the wealths of all persons in a society is not the same
as societal wealth. Since the Rule against Perpetuities applies to interests in land and other
resources, this Article uses the term wealth only to refer to material goods, though
nonmaterial wealth such as human capital is, obviously, also important. For a succinct
overview of some of the intractable problems involved in defining the wealth of nations, see
Heilbroner's entry on wealth in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
880-82 (J. Eatwell, M. Milgate & P. Newman eds. 1987).
100. The creation of future interests that are contingent because they are held by an
unidentifiable person has a detrimental effect similar to, but likely less than, that attending
the creation of interests following a defeasible estate. The spouse of a person whose widow
is to receive an interest might equivalently be considered to be holding an interest that is
subject to the condition precedent that she remain alive and married to the identified
person until he dies. The difference is that the creation of an interest in an unidentifiable
person does not require that the previous estate be defeasible. It does, however, require
that some interest become defeasible. See supra note 97.
The creation of interests that are vested subject to open also diminishes enjoyment,
albeit possibly to an even lesser degree. The creation of a future interest in great-
grandchildren would leave those who have already attained that status open to the
possibility that they would have to share their asset with others that might come along
later. This risk of partial loss would probably reduce value.
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future interests in relatively important assets and even less often
create interests that might not vest for decades, we can conclude
that the creation of contingent interests in Blackacre, especially
contingent interests of uncertain duration, will probably reduce
the value of Blackacre.101
The Rule against Perpetuities increases societal wealth in
some cases by extinguishing contingent future interests that
reduce the value of the underlying asset. These cases include all
of those like Examples 2 and 2a in which the Rule redistributes
rights from a purported transferee to the immediately preceding
estate holder. When the Rule merely redistributes rights from a
purported transferee to the transferor, as in Examples 1, 3, 4, 5,
and 6, the Rule generates none of this beneficial effect because it
redistributes the interests without reducing uncertainties caused
by risk of loss.10 2
F The Third Benefit: Accelerated Enjoyment
Examples 3 and 6 (if it is changed from a grant to a devise)
illustrate the third type of beneficial effect generated by the Rule:
hastened enjoyment. The redistributions accomplished by the
Rule in those examples enhance wealth by taking the contingent
interest from someone that is not yet alive and placing it in the
hands of a person that is alive and, therefore, able to enjoy the
ownership. The point here is not that possession will occur ear-
lier for the recipient than for the loser of the redistributed rights.
(The date of possession, of course, will not change because the
Rule does not change the event that causes a change of posses-
sion.). Rather, the point is that the recipient is alive and, for
that reason, will enjoy and value the rights in a way that the
loser cannot. Because the rights redistributed are contingent,
they might not be worth much. Nevertheless, they are worth
something. 10 3 They are certainly worth more now to a person
that is alive than to one that is not because the living recipient
can enjoy the knowledge that he owns those contingent rights.
101. The point applies equally to other resources.
102. A redistribution like that in Example 5 (see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying
text) may reduce the detrimental effects of uncertainty by making a number of
contingencies important to only one person. Whether one person enjoys the ownership of
two contingent interests more than two persons would enjoy separate ownership of the two
contingencies remains a matter of speculation.
103. A contingent future interest that has a 20% chance of becoming possessory 100
years from now should be worth nearly 2% of the current market value of the land. This
figure assumes a 5% long-term inflation rate and a 7.5% long-term interest rate.
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That appreciation, from the time the Rule operates until the pur-
ported transferee would have become aware of his rights, repre-
sents a direct gain in happiness. 11 In short the Rule tends to
redistribute rights so they can be enjoyed sooner.
So the Rule has three closely related, beneficial effects, some
or all of which may obtain in any given case. First, as recog-
nized by most authorities, the Rule makes more likely the effi-
cient use of resources by collecting rights into bundles more
easily exchanged, which facilitates market reallocation to the
best use and best user. Second, the Rule increases wealth by
sorting rights into packages that generate more enjoyment for
the holders, irrespective of whether those packages of rights,
those interests, are subsequently reallocated in the market.
Third, the Rule accelerates enjoyment by redistributing rights
from persons that are not yet alive and cannot possibly appreci-
ate their interest to persons that are alive and able to enjoy their
rights.
Although the Rule against Perpetuities may generate sub-
stantial benefits, it will not necessarily do so--even in the sorts
of cases discussed above. For example, though "A's widower" is
technically unidentifiable while A lives, A's widower is for practi-
cal purposes identifiable if A is ninety-years old and on her death
bed. In such a case, a purchaser can negotiate with A's husband
with some confidence that he will turn out to be her widower.
Any redistribution by the Rule to the transferor, such as in
Example 5, does little to improve purchasability. The argument
here, to the extent there is one, is that the Rule may generate at
least three different sorts of economic gains. This Article does
not contend that it always does so. 10 5
Some scholars have criticized the Rule because it does not
apply in many situations in which improved resource allocation
would accrue from its application. The Rule does not apply to
possibilities of reverter, for example. If such interests were sub-
ject to the Rule, some of them would be invalidated, leaving
fewer interest holders and, thus, improving purchasability.
104. This argument does not depend upon any discounting of future happiness to
present value. The argument here is that happiness (from knowledge of ownership) for a
long time is better than the same happiness for a short time. By definition, the future utils
are worth just as much as the present utils derived from awareness of ownership of the
contingent interest. The acceleration benefit simply adds some current utils to the future
utils; it does not weigh one against the other.
105. For a specific example of a situation in which none of the enumerated benefits
accrues, see infra subpart II(H).
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While this criticism serves the useful purpose of causing us to
inquire into whether the scope of the Rule ought to be expanded,
it does not justify restricting the scope of the Rule or eliminating
it entirely.
So far, this Article has discussed only the redistributions of
rights actually wrought by operation of the Rule. The Rule also
causes a similar private redistribution of rights from remote
transferees to less remote ones by informing some transferors,
those that learn of the Rule, that their intended transfer will not
be honored. In such situations the transferors themselves redis-
tribute the rights to avoid the Rule. 10 6 Because there are many
ways to avoid the Rule, such private redistributions (via redraft-
ings) of individual parties are much less predictable than the
Rule's redistributions. Nevertheless, transferors probably will
redistribute rights in ways similar to those worked by the Rule:
from remote to less remote persons and from unidentifiable to
identifiable persons. Thus the Rule may create the same benefits
of improved allocation and accelerated enjoyment when it acts
as a barrier between intent and effectuation as it does when it
nullifies language expressed by a grantor. The enhanced enjoy-
ment benefit seems less likely to accrue from private redistribu-
tions designed to avoid the Rule than from the operation of the
Rule. The transferor probably will not choose to eliminate the
contingency to avoid the Rule, but the Rule itself may eliminate
the contingency entirely.
Transfers that avoid the Rule with a saving clause will have
the same tendency to redistribute rights from remote and
unidentifiable persons to nearer persons identified in the saving
clause. Unlike the redistribution accomplished by the Rule,
however, this shifting of rights via a saving clause only redistrib-
utes a portion of the rights of the remote and unidentified per-
sons. Those persons stay in the picture along with the saving
clause recipient(s), the two holding essentially alternative contin-
gent interests. Private redistributions accomplished by a saving
clause, therefore, should be expected not to achieve the same
degree of benefit as those accomplished by the Rule. Indeed, one
106. The word "redistribution" here refers to the change the transferor makes in her
intention and the operative instrument to avoid the Rule. The redistribution is from one
person who would have gotten the rights if the transferor could have accomplished her
original intent, but for the existence of the Rule, to another person who receives the rights
under the document as drafted to avoid the Rule.
1990]
HeinOnline  -- 64 Tul. L. Rev. 741 1989-1990
TULANE LAW REVIEW[o
should question whether the purchasability and enjoyability ben-
efits accrue at all when a saving clause is used to avoid the Rule.
G. Explaining Two Applications of the Rule with these Three
Benefits
1. Trusts
The failure to identify the benefits flowing from the reduc-
tion of risk and hastening of enjoyment accomplished by the
operation of the Rule against Perpetuities and an undue preoc-
cupation with the purchasability rationale may have led some
observers to conclude that, were it not an aid to the imposition
of death taxes, the Rule ought not to apply to interests in
trust. 107 When the legal title to an asset (land or otherwise) is
held by a single entity, a trustee, there is no barrier to the trans-
fer of the asset to another person who might put the resource to
better use. The existence of equitable perpetuities would not
impede the efficient allocation of the asset by the market. 108
Because the improved allocation benefit does not obtain in cases
involving trusts, it might be said, equitable interests ought to be
free from the remorseless application of the Rule. 0 9
The courts have not followed that approach, however.
They have instead applied the Rule to equitable and legal future
interests alike.110 That insistence on applying the Rule can be
explained and might be justified by the other two benefits of the
Rule: reduction of risk and acceleration of enjoyment. The psy-
chological harms caused by risk of loss reduce the value of bene-
ficial interests just as they do to the value of legal interests.
Hence, the Rule against Perpetuities can increase the value of
equitable interests in assets just as it increases the value of legal
interests, by eliminating the risk of loss. Deferred awareness of
an equitable interest diminishes its enjoyment just as it dimin-
ishes the enjoyment of a legal interest. Application of the Rule
can accelerate, and thereby increase, the enjoyment of the inter-
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.1(3) reporter's note (1983)
(suggesting that preservation of death taxes is the reason for applying the Rule to beneficial
interests; the note does not say that is the only reason, but it suggests no other).
108. See id. at 9. The efficient allocation rationale also has some difficulty explaining
the application of the Rule to intangibles. As noted by Professor Casner, "[R]estrictions
operable as to. .. shares or bonds would in no way hamper the utilization of its assets by
the issuing corporation." Id.
109. See Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 36, at 1075-76.
110. F. SCHWARTZ, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 19
(1988).
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est. These two benefits provide at least a rationale for including
trusts within the ambit of the Rule, and may be enough to vindi-
cate such application of the Rule to beneficial interests.
A different argument sometimes offered in support of the
application of the Rule to trusts possibly misses its mark. This
position maintains that the Rule against Perpetuities serves, ben-
eficially, to frustrate a wealthy transferor's attempt to create a
dynasty by taking control of assets out of the hands of suc-
ceeding generations. Assuming the Rule does keep a tycoon
from creating trusts that would prevent excessive consumption
by more flamboyant members of her family, because of the Rule
the spendthrifts will have greater ability to consume their
endowment. And, at least in the settlor's view, her successors
will likely exploit that power, consuming more than they would
be allowed to consume by a trustee. Thus the Rule reduces the
likelihood that the dynasty will survive.
What is open to doubt is not the consequence of the Rule,
but the desirability of that consequence. Dynasties may be bad
for a number of reasons. The concentrated economic power may
be used to concentrate political power in the few, subverting the
political process. They may reduce happiness by generating
envy and a sense of inequity. Furthermore, economic dynasties
may be criticized as being simply unfair because some live so
well without having to do anything to earn their keep. For all of
these reasons, the Rule's tendency to interfere with the creation
of dynasties could be beneficial.
Dynasties might also be attacked on the ground that they
represent bad distributions of wealth. To the extent that this is
the problem with dynasties, the Rule reaps no gains. The conse-
quence of the Rule is not to redistribute wealth from persons
that do not need it to persons that do. The consequence of the
Rule, as seen above, is to enhance the ability of the tycoon's
heirs to spend and consume the wealth. To be sure, their con-
sumption reduces the familial coffers, reducing the longevity of
the dynasty. At the same time, their spending reduces societal
wealth. The wealth is not transferred to the poor. It is con-
sumed.111 Allowing the transferor to perpetuate her dynasty
111. Some may note that consumption can create jobs. But investment creates jobs
plus a little bit more for the rest of society. (Savings are investment via a middleman.).
The difference between the societal effects of consumption and investment can be illustrated
with a simple example. Assume that a rich beneficiary of a trust buys a Cadillac. Such a
car might be consumed in joy-riding or, more respectably, in vacation transportation.
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would probably increase the allocation of resources to produc-
tive enterprises, 1 2 generating riches for the family and generat-
ing wealth for the rest of society in the process.' 3
Whether the Rule ought to be applied to trusts to prevent
dynasties depends on one's reasons for disliking dynasties. Sen-
sible political and social reasons favor the destruction of dynas-
ties. But the price paid for such destruction is the consumption
by the rich of assets that might have been allocated to produc-
tion. If the primary desire is to augment the wealth of the poor
and the other reasons for disliking dynasties stated above are of
little importance, destruction of dynasties does not constitute a
sound justification for applying the Rule to trusts.
There is, however, a related benefit that might help to jus-
tify subjecting trusts to the Rule against Perpetuities.1 4 Leaving
aside the consumption issue, the Rule could change the pattern
of investment of the familial riches not consumed. Fiduciary
duties constrain trustees to make conservative investments. If
the beneficiary, because of risk aversion or for any other reason,
would make similarly conservative investments, the trust does
not operate to bias investment. 1 5 But in cases in which the ben-
eficiary would purchase correctly more risk than the trustee,11 6
the existence of the trust skews investment toward safety, inter-
Alternatively, the Cadillac might be used in a limousine service or rental agency. In either
case, and to an equal degree, the production and maintenance of the car produces jobs and
wages for persons other than the beneficiary. But the use to which the car is put makes an
important difference to society. If it is consumed, that is the end of the story; the
consumption benefits the beneficiary, presumably, but the car will generate no more
benefits for the rest of society. If on the other hand it is allocated to production, i.e., used
as a business asset, it provides additional good for society. If it is rented out, the renter
accrues some gains from that exchange. If it rolls in a fleet of limousines, someone gains
from the exchange of money for limo service, and the driver gains a job. Of course the
choice between investment and consumption is more likely to present itself as a choice
between a steak dinner and a share of AT&T, but the principle remains the same. The
societal advantages of investment and production over consumption by the dynastic rich
suggest that the Rule's encouragement of consumption disserves societal interests.
112. It is possible, however, that the assets will be invested unwisely.
113. The capitalist cannot capture all the extra value created in production.
114. This point, like the traditional argument above, depends on the dubious
assumption that the Rule reduces the number of trusts.
115. Although possible, it is unlikely that the trustee, even though constrained, would
make substantially more risky investments than the beneficiary. Settlors usually use a trust
when the beneficiary would, in their view, be insufficiently cautious with money.
116. A beneficiary correctly purchases a risky asset when his purchase accurately
accounts for his own risk aversion. The assumption that the individual best knows his own
aversion is especially subject to question when a trustee has been appointed to exercise his
discretion.
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fering with the market allocation of resources. By taking control
out of the hands of trustees, the Rule frees up the family's
endowment for more risky investment.' 1 7 Freeing capital from
investment constraints is one more potential benefit of applying
the Rule to trusts. 118
2. Charitable Gifts
Just as the second benefit, the reduction of losses accompa-
nying risk, helps to explain the application of the Rule to benefi-
cial interests, it also helps to explain the narrowness of the
Rule's exception for gifts to charities. Ordinarily, contingent
interests created in charities are treated the same as other con-
tingent interests for purposes of the Rule against Perpetuities.
Example 8: 0 conveys Blackacre "to A and A's heirs, but if
A's descendants discontinue residence on Blackacre then to the
Methodist Church and its successors and assigns."
Because of the Rule, the Methodist Church receives nothing
from this transfer. The contingent interest held by the Church
might vest more than twenty-one years after the deaths of every-
one alive at the time of the transfer and is, therefore, void. A
gets a fee simple absolute. But the Rule does not always apply to
contingent interests held by charities. Transfers in which both
of the transferees are charities are not subject to the Rule.119
Example 9: 0 conveys Blackacre "to the Unitarian Church,
but if the Unitarians cease to use the grounds for Church meet-
ings then to the Catholic Church."
Even though the interest in the Catholic Church might vest too
late, the interest does not violate the Rule because of this special
exception for charities.
The "alienability" (purchasability) rationale often used to
justify the Rule cannot explain this difference in the Rule's treat-
ment of Examples 8 and 9. The outstanding contingent interest
would impede transfers in both cases equally. To strike down
117. The development of relatively low-risk mutual funds in high-risk sectors of the
market and other applications of portfolio theory should decrease the degree to which
assets held in trust are precluded from reaching the high-risk ventures, further mitigating
this benefit of applying the Rule to trusts.
118. Given two investments, one with an expected return greater than the other, the
trustee might choose the one with the lower expected return because of his obligation to
avoid risk. If the forgone investment has a greater expected utility (accounting for the true
risk aversion of the beneficiary), the trustee's choice misallocates capital.
119. See 5A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 770[l] & n.4 (P. Rohan
ed. 1988).
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the interests in the Catholic and Methodist Churches would in
each case consolidate the ownership in the hands of one entity,
freeing Blackacre for transfer. Not to void the contingent inter-
est in each case leaves an additional interest to be located and
acquired by someone wanting to develop Blackacre.
However, if all three of the above benefits of, or rationales
for, the Rule are considered together, both the exception and its
narrowness make some sense. The acceleration benefit, to take
the easiest case first, cannot be used to justify the application of
the Rule to any interest held by an existing charity because both
entities are now able to enjoy ownership. If that were the only
rationale for the Rule, the exception should extend to all contin-
gent interests owned by charities, preserving them from invalida-
tion by the Rule.
The purchasability rationale, by contrast, supports applying
the Rule to all interests held by charities because such applica-
tion may effect some improvements in purchasability. If the
rights held by the charity are redistributed to the prior interest
holder, a would-be purchaser can negotiate with one fewer
owner. If the rights are redistributed to the grantor, the pur-
chaser can deal with an individual instead of an organization,
which might be slow to make the institutional decision to sell.
Notwithstanding these enhancements, the purchasability case
for applying the Rule is much weaker when a charity holds the
interest than when the contingent interest in question is held by
an individual or class. Because charities are somewhat easier to
locate, have the legal capacity to negotiate for themselves, and
rarely die leaving numerous heirs, the existence of a contingent
future interest in the hands of a charity might well cause fewer
acquisition problems to a prospective purchaser than would the
existence of a similar interest in the hands of a human. Further-
more, a redistribution that snaps the rights back to the testatrix
would move the interest from a single entity to multiple hands if
the residuary clause of her will specifies a group of persons or if
there is no such clause and the heirs are many. For these rea-
sons, the purchasability benefit is much more doubtful and,
hence, much less important when a charity holds the interest
under scrutiny. Nonetheless, the Rule could effect some
improved resource allocation.
The weakness of the purchasability rationale and the inap-
plicability of the acceleration rationale indicate that the Rule
ought not to apply to any interest held by a charity. Yet the
746 [Vol. 64
HeinOnline  -- 64 Tul. L. Rev. 746 1989-1990
DEAD HAND CONTROL
exception is not that broad. The exception applies only if both
the contingent future interest and the preceding interest are held
by charities. Nothing in those two rationales explains the nar-
rowness of the exception now found in the law.
Attention to the enjoyability of risky interests, however,
furthers the explanation of the exception by offering a reason to
distinguish between the two examples above. Charities are prob-
ably less bothered by defeasibility because, by their nature and
often by law, charities have more fixed and limited purposes and
goals than individuals or businesses. Their needs and the partic-
ular uses to which they will put assets probably shift less over
time. 2 ' If this is so, a limitation attached to an interest that will
terminate that interest upon the occurrence of some specified use
or nonuse will decrease the enjoyment of the asset by the charity
to a lesser degree than a similar limitation would for an individ-
ual or business. In other words, regarding the sorts of risks usu-
ally created by restrictions attached to gifts to charities, the
possibility of losing the asset upon a proscribed use causes a
somewhat less detrimental effect to the charities. 121 Assuming
this is true, the enjoyability rationale for applying the Rule is
slightly less persuasive when the interest under scrutiny follows
a defeasible interest held by a charity. Considering only the
enjoyability of interests, then, it could be argued that the Rule
ought not to apply to interests following those in charities. 122
120. Businesses are often criticized for having only a narrow profit motive. But that
motive, narrow as it is, allows greater freedom of physical movement than the purposes
stated in the articles of incorporation of many nonprofit organizations that are tied to local
communities. That fact alone should reduce the frequency that charities wish to sell their
lands compared to ordinary businesses. In addition, the articles of incorporation of
charities often enumerate purposes that are more circumscribed than general profitmaking.
121. This proposition is the same as saying that charities might be expected to be
bothered less by the restriction attached to their use.
122. The exception's narrowness might also be explained as a judicial attempt to
avoid creating disincentives for charitable giving. See R. POWELL, supra note 119, t
770[1]. Transferors need to be able to create a mechanism for enforcing otherwise
precatory language to be assured that their gift will be used for the desired and expected,
socially beneficial purposes. Id. As suggested by Professor Epstein, "Henry Ford would
probably die if he knew the kinds of project that the Ford Foundation sponsors. John
MacArthur might have left it all to his kids if he had known. Keeping the next generation
in line is a lot harder than is often supposed." Letter from Professor Richard Epstein to the
author (Nov. 21, 1988). The defeasible estate provides one mechanism for enforcing the
transferor's intended use of the asset. This rationale has some difficulty, however,
explaining the result of In re Tyler, 3 Ch. 252 (1891), which applied the exception although
the shift from one charity to another was intended to insure that some funds would be used
for non-charitable purposes. See R. POWELL, supra note 119, 770[1] & n.7. The
combination of enjoyability and purchasability rationales better explains the court's result
1990]
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But, of course, the exception is not that broad either. The excep-
tion suspends the operation of the Rule only when all three
rationales, acceleration, enjoyability, and allocation, are under-
mined, which occurs when charities hold both the contingent
interest in question and the preceding defeasible interest. 12 3
H. A Critique of One Application of the Rule
A reader might at this point ask which of the enumerated
benefits justifies the operation of the Rule in cases like Example
1. The common-law Rule takes the future interest from an
apparently intended transferee, B, and moves it back to the gran-
tor, 0, or the grantor's successor. What good is that? None.
The land is no more purchasable, no more enjoyable, and no
more quickly enjoyed than before the application of the Rule.
The transfer, and others like it, might just as well be excepted
from the operation of the Rule, but it is not. Though this might
be justified on the ground that the Rule cannot bear any more
complexity, that argument assumes too much about the unat-
tractiveness of complexity-a topic taken up later.
III. THE BENEFITS OF RECOGNIZING CONTINGENT
INTERESTS
One might conclude from the discussion above that contin-
gent interests ought to be abolished entirely. But that does not
necessarily follow. The existence of contingent interests could
diminish societal wealth, but refusing to allow contingent inter-
ests would also result in losses.
A. Maintaining Efficient Incentives
An owner's right to transfer to someone else whatever por-
tions of an asset she pleases inheres in our popular notions of
legal ownership. 124 More specifically, "the right to pass on prop-
in that case. Moreover, the interests stricken by the Rule are not essential for this
enforcement purpose. Future interests retained by the transferor could be used instead of
future interests in third parties.
123. When the preceding interest is not defeasible, the enjoyability rationale is
undermined whether the preceding interest is held by a charity or otherwise. Under this
view, the Rule ought not apply to interests held by charities when the preceding interest is
indefeasible. I am not aware of any cases raising this issue. Although the enjoyability
rationale helps to explain the exception for charities, it does not completely justify the
contours of that exception because the exception supposedly applies even if the preceding
interest is not defeasible.
124. However, the common law did not consider all rights in land to be alienable.
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erty lies at or near the core of the ordinary notion of property
ownership; it has been part of the Anglo-American legal system
since feudal times." 125 The right to transfer is fundamental and
both mutual exchanges and unilateral transfers serve good eco-
nomic purpose. Mutual exchanges help, of course, to allocate
assets efficiently. As noted above, the market does create and
exchange some contingent interests (insurance and options), and
it would ill serve efficiency to impede those exchanges with a
rule of law prohibiting the creation of all contingent future
interests.
A narrower rule disallowing only donative transfers of con-
tingent interests would probably be circumvented too easily to
be useful. Even if such a rule could be made effective, and even
assuming the rule would have no negative effects on market
transactions, 126 it could impair efficiency. Although donative
transfers do not warrant the presumption, given to mutual
exchanges, 127 that they distribute rights to the most appreciative
owner, societal recognition of donative transfers carries other
efficiency-enhancing side effects. Allowing owners to give their
assets and money to others, whether at death or inter vivos, cre-
ates an incentive for productive activities. 28 For some persons
that have acquired enough material possessions to care little
about further increases in their own power to consume, the
opportunity to donate to selected others may add enough reason
to produce to cause them to invest their personal efforts or capi-
tal in productive activities.
The flip side of the same coin is that a legal prohibition of
certain transfers may lead to wasteful consumption by the
owner. 129 If the law prevents owners from doing what they wish
Contingent remainders, rights of entry for condition broken, and possibilities of reverter
could not be transfered to third parties. See, eg., Mahrenholz v. County Bd. of School
Trustees, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, 369-70, 417 N.E.2d 138, 141 (1981).
125. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1624 (1988) (citing Hodel
v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1987)).
126. Donors would attempt to circumvent the rule by making their gifts appear more
like exchanges. Courts attempting to distinguish the two situations could mistake small
exchanges and other borderline but bona fide mutual exchanges for unilateral gifts. When
that mistake occurs and the market gets wind of it, the parties to mutual exchanges will
take special (and wasteful) precautions to establish the bona fides of their transaction.
127. Transactions that appear to be mutual exchanges may be in fact partly donative,
undermining the assumption that the transferor knew of no more appreciative transferee.
128. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian
Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 723, 735-36 (1986); Haskell, supra note 3, at
560.
129. Ellickson, supra note 128, at 735-36.
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with their money, they might just spend it. The easy availability
of annuities has made this problem worse today than it was in
the distant past. A testatrix blocked by the law from making her
desired gift at death has today a handy means for making sure
that her endowment does not pass to anyone else, without jeop-
ardizing her own security. Any rules discouraging donative
transfer will increase consumption by persons who have them-
selves decided that they would enjoy the consumption less than
their intended beneficiaries. In addition to causing misallocation
of consumption, the prohibition of contingent interests acceler-
ates consumption, causing it to occur sooner rather than later.
This too wastes assets because assets saved and put to productive
use rather than being consumed will grow so that more can be
consumed in the future. Saving now allows greater consumption
in the future.130 Maintaining incentives for efficient behavior by
would-be transferors is one good reason, then, to allow gifts of
contingent interests.13 1
B. Transfers as Consumption
Maintenance of efficient incentives is not the only reason to
allow gifts of contingent interests. Notwithstanding the fact that
the creation of a contingent combination'reduces value, the act
of donating such a combination may itself represent the most
efficient use of an asset. When a rich aunt divides her estate
among her well-heeled nephews, she passes up an opportunity to
give to needy families to whom the gifts would make more differ-
ence. She, like most of us, would rather help close relatives and
friends a little than help strangers a lot.'3 2 In other words, she
enjoys giving, and the amount of her enjoyment varies with the
beneficiary. 33 Too much attention to the efficiency of resource
130. As a matter of social policy, the efficient and fair balance between present
consumption and savings is tricky. Savings now create a reservoir for future consumption.
But if those who consume in the future have greater endowments and have similar,
declining marginal utility curves, their consumption will generate less happiness than
would have the consumption by the original saver.
131. Of course, the Rule will generate few of these inefficient incentives because the
Rule easily can be avoided with a saving clause. See infra notes 170 & 172. I only want to
mention that incentive effects are one reason for allowing contingent interests. Another
reason for allowing such interests is to allow interests to be made subject to the condition of
survival until distribution, thus saving any additional probate expenses associated with
transfers to recipients that die before distribution.
132. For a possible reason for this taste, see supra subpart II(C).
133. As stated by Cooter, "the donor... maximiz[es] the sum of his own utility and
the donee's utility." Roundtable, supra note 3, at 851.
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allocation after the gift becomes effective obscures that the hap-
piness derived by the donor from the act of giving must also be
included in the sum when values are added up. Because benefac-
tors enjoy making gifts, a prohibition on certain gifts could pre-
vent them from squeezing the maximum happiness from their
holdings.
The proposition can be stated more generally. In many,
indeed most, cases the act of giving is not a form of consump-
tion, or at least not a form of consumption that precludes others
from consuming the subject matter of the gift.134 Yet when a
transferor divides the fights in an asset into vested and contin-
gent interests and transfers those fights out to others, the asset
so transferred generates less happiness in its holders than if she
had given full ownership outright to a sole donee. In the act of
giving, the donor has consumed the difference between the value
of the resource if solely owned and the value of the resource held
in the resulting several interests. 135
That the transferor forewent the possibility of selling full
ownership of the asset is some evidence that the transferor
enjoyed making the gift in the form chosen more than enough to
make up for the losses in enjoyment caused to her beneficiaries.
If anyone, including the intended beneficiaries, prized full own-
ership more highly than she prized making the gift, he would
have purchased from her. The loss of enjoyment to the transfer-
ees occasioned by the fragmentation of the gift makes itself
known to the transferor not solely through the concern the
transferor has for her transferees, 136 but also by the Coasian
mechanism of the potential bargain between the transferor and a
buyer. In giving a divided gift, she passed up two opportunities:
the chance to give an undivided interest and the chance to sell an
134. Professor Andrews has argued, for this reason, that gifts should be deducted
from income for purposes of the income tax because gifts are neither savings nor
consumption. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV.
309, 348-56 (1972).
135. The amount preclusively consumed by the donor is limited to the cost of
consolidating all the interests in one person. When the costs of the transactions necessary
to accomplish that result are too high, this theoretical limit frequently has no practical
effect.
136. Any argument that the transferor rationally weighs her gains from
fragmentation against the losses of the transferees ignores that the donor, when rationally
deciding to give, considers only the utility she derives from the enjoyment by her
beneficiaries rather than the enjoyment derived by the beneficiaries. The argument here
does not assume that the transferor's interest in the donees' enjoyment will cause her to
give appropriate weight to their loss of enjoyment from the fragmented gift.
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undivided interest. It is the failure to take the latter opportunity
that indicates the act of fragmented giving was efficient.
Nevertheless, for several reasons this evidence cannot be
considered conclusive on the issue of efficiency. First, the trans-
feror may not have known how much the market was willing to
pay for the undivided interests. Second, an insufficient endow-
ment may have prevented those who would have taken more
enjoyment from the whole package of rights from making their
utilities known through the market mechanism.'37 Third, one of
the donees might have prized full ownership more than enough
to pay the price needed to keep the donor from breaking up the
interests, but he might have avoided the bargain because after
paying full price he would get only half an interest more than he
would have gotten via the gift for which he would have paid
nothing. 138 Despite these possibilities, the transferor's choice of
giving over selling suggests that, once the transferor's utility is
factored in, the donative transfer of divided interests may have
enhanced net utility.
Transferors of property have long shown a strong tendency
to transfer interests to their descendants.1 39 They may simply
have "other-regarding" preferences. 4°  Or perhaps it pleases
them to think that they will be remembered through the centu-
ries as the provider of the family's financial security. By tying
up the assets or by transferring identifiable interests to each suc-
cessive possessor, the transferor increases the odds that she will
get credit for passing down the riches. In thus assuring that she
will be remembered, the donor creates a memorial to herself.141
137. This problem of wealth effects may be particularly likely in situations involving
recipients of gifts if such persons tend to be more likely than usual to be unable to afford the
asset.
138. This disincentive to bargaining would not appear if the donee expected to get, as
a gift, the same share of the cash as of the asset. In the same vein, this disincentive would
not apply to persons that did not expect to be donees.
139. A recent example of someone having this tendency is Sol Goldman, who died in
1987, leaving an estate of one billion dollars. He had hoped that his real estate empire
would be kept intact for his grandchildren's grandchildren. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1988,
§ 10, at 1, col. 3.
140. Which others one might expect donors to prefer is explored above. See supra
subpart II(C).
141. Lord Kames explains the creation of fee tail estates by reference to this aspect of
human nature:
The man who has amassed great wealth, cannot think of quiting his hold, and yet,
alas! he must die and leave the enjoyment to others. To colour a dismal prospect,
he makes a deed arresting fleeting property, securing his estate to himself, and to
those who represent him, in an endless train of succession. His estate and his
[Vol. 64752
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Maybe some taste quite different from immortality, such as an
antimarket preference, 142 motivates owners of property to break
the subsequent ownership into vested and contingent interests.
Regardless of the reason for the preference, 14 3 taking away the
power to achieve it would deny owners that form of
consumption.
IV. THE RULE'S INFLUENCE ON CONSUMPTION
A. Mediating Intergenerational Conflict
Professor Simes, in his Thomas Cooley lectures at Michigan
Law School, recognized this conflict between satisfying the
desires of donors and donees and used it to justify the Rule.
First, the Rule against Perpetuities strikes a fair balance
between the desires of members of the present generation, and
similar desires of succeeding generations, to do what they wish
with the property they enjoy .... Indeed ... there is a policy in
favor of permitting people to create future interests by will, as
well as present interests, because that also accords with human
desires. The difficulty here is that, if we give free rein to the
desires of one generation to create future interests, the mem-
bers of succeeding generations will receive the property in a
restricted state .... Hence, to come most nearly to satisfying
the desires of peoples of all generations, we must strike a fair
balance between unrestricted testamentary disposition of prop-
erty by the present generations and unrestricted disposition by
future generations."
heirs must for ever bear his name; every thing to perpetuate his memory and his
wealth. How unfit for the frail condition of mortals, are such swoln conceptions?
The feudal system unluckily suggested a hint for gratifying this irrational
appetite. Entails in England, authorised by statute, spread every where with great
rapidity, till becoming a publick nusance ....
1 H. HOME (LORD KAMES), HISTORICAL LAW-TRAcTS 218 (1758).
142. Cooter suggests the antimarket preference as one explanation for donor
behavior. Roundtable, supra note 3, at 853. Other explanations suggest themselves. In
Example 2, see supra text accompanying notes 27-28, the donor might derive satisfaction
from the knowledge that B has the power to keep A from selling liquors, not because she
cares whether A sells liquors, but because she knows that B cares whether A sells liquors
and wants to make B happy. (While alive, B will have that power whether or not B can
transfer his interest to A.).
143. Professor Harry Pratter, of Indiana University-Bloomington School of Law,
has captured the irrelevance of the reasons underlying preference in the following Cartesian
suggestion for an economist's maxim: "I prefer; therefore, I am right." Harry Pratter,
Professor Emeritus, Indiana University-Bloomington School of Law (Fall 1988)
(comment in faculty lounge).
144. L. SIMas, supra note 3, at 57-58. The quote continues: "In a sense this is a
policy of alienability, but it is not alienability for productivity. It is alienability to enable
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The law does not, however, generally restrain consumption
of chattels, 145 or otherwise restrain consumption of realty. 146 If a
person likes to see Rolls Royces plummet from cliffs, she will not
be stopped from rolling her own cars off her own cliffs, regard-
less of the losses her descendants will suffer, as long as the rest of
her behavior stays close enough to social norms to prevent a dec-
laration of incompetency. 147 With regard to disposition of pri-
vate property, the common law does not generally engage in
balancing the interests of present and future generations of
people to do what they please at death with the property which they enjoy in life." Id. at
59. The Restatement also recognizes this dimension of the Rule:
[T]he rule against perpetuities provides an adjustment or balance between the
desire of the current owner of property to prolong indefinitely into the future his
control over the devolution and use thereof and the desire of the person who will
in the future become the owner of the affected land or other thing to be free from
the dead hand.
RESTATEMENT (DONATIVE TRANSFERS), supra note 3, at 8. The third purpose identified
by the Restatement as being served by the Rule, that of aiding current owners in respond-
ing to exigencies, see supra note 84, might best be understood as a further elaboration of
this general balancing between generations.
This struggle between generations does not manifest itself as such in the courts.
Judges often hear cases between living persons whose generations cannot be compared
because they are not related to each other. One party in the case argues for less restricted
alienability, and another argues more restricted alienability. It is the rules by which they
trace their claim, not their generation, that will determine their perspective.
145. One possible exception involves instructions (in a will) to destroy private papers.
Nevertheless, the law (in particular the application of income taxes to corporations) has, at
times, been criticized for favoring consumption over savings. See generally THE UNEASY
COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX (A. Aaron, H. Galper
& J. Pechman eds. 1988).
146. It is not a common-law crime to burn down one's own house. People v.
Dewinton, 113 Cal. 403, 404-05, 45 P. 708, 709 (1896); State v. Keena, 63 Conn. 329, 329-
30, 28 A. 522, 522 (1893); Brown v. Rouillard, 102 A. 701, 703 (1917); State v. Haynes, 66
Me. 307 (1876); Bloss v. Tobey, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 320 (1824) (indicating that it is not
slander to state that a person has burned his own store as to do so is not a criminal act);
Haas v. State, 103 Ohio St. 1, 1-2, 132 N.E. 158, 158 (1921); 1 M. HALE P.C. *568, 2 East
P.C. 1022 (1803) (not arson at common law to burn one's own house); cf People v. George,
109 P.2d 404, 406 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941) (conviction of owner of statutory crime of
maliciously burning house affirmed against constitutional challenge).
Although the law does not impede the consumption of realty by living persons, it does
stop some forms of consumption after death. Courts have ordered executors not to destroy
realty after the death of the testator despite express orders to do so. See National City
Bank v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 7 Ohio Op. 3d 100, 104-05, 369 N.E.2d 814, 818-19 (1976)
(demolition of testatrix's home allowed to prevent "desecration" by conversion to nursing
home or business); Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975) (trustee enjoined from demolishing house as per orders in will); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Scott, 88 Minn. 386, 93 N.W. 109 (1903); cf. I.R.C. § 280B (1982) (disallowing
a deduction for the loss of structures demolished by the owner).
147. A declaration of incompetency is the legal way to restrain consumption by
owners.
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adults;148 the balance is usually struck in favor of whatever the
owner decides to do with her asset.149 The law of future interests
fits this framework; it allows owners, should they wish to do so,
to consume a portion of the value of their assets by dividing
ownership among beneficiaries in ways that reduce the value of
the resources.
Perhaps the law should restrain current consumption for
the benefit of future generations. That it does not- is no argu-
ment that it ought not. Maybe fairness requires that the unborn
be protected against the sins of their parents. 150  If those alive
now have a moral obligation to conserve assets so that future
generations may be assured sufficient ability to consume, legal
doctrines like the Rule against Perpetuities serve that moral pur-
pose. One could argue, on the other hand, that it is immoral to
force a transfer of rights from one person or group to another
even if an overall increase in wealth is guaranteed. Under that
view, the Rule works across moral purposes. 151
The proposition that the law should restrain consumption is
more difficult to justify on utilitarian grounds. The increased
potential for consumption-based happiness arising from the
growth of savings over time will be offset if those who consume
in the future have more assets to consume. Assuming that the
assets of society are increasing and will continue to do so, and
assuming that those that follow will have the same marginal util-
ity curves as those that live now, and assuming that those curves
slope downward, a person that consumes an asset in the future
148. The law does require that parents support the next generation during its
minority, but no further. The intergenerational issue is a major question, however, in the
allocation of publicly provided goods (health care rationing, for example) and in the
resolution of maternal-fetal conflicts (as in use of drugs during pregnancy), see generally 2
Bio LAW § 5-2.4, at U:675-79 (1987).
149. One might argue that we should treat land differently from other assets because
it is finite. Even assuming the supply of land itself is inelastic, however, perpetuities
consume interests in land rather than the land itself. The interests, as distinguished from
the land, may be recreated by labor just as Rolls Royces may be recreated by labor. The
consumption of land here involved is limited by the cost of collecting the interests into one
person's hands, a cost measured in terms of human services rather than land resources.
150. Professor Sterk makes a fairness argument that assets should be preserved for
future generations in Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 634-41 (1985). See also B. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 107-221 (1980) (chapter entitled Justice Over
Time); J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284-93 (1971) (chapter entitled The Problem of
Justice Between Generations).
151. This Article does not pursue these two moral questions. For an essay on the
practices and incentives that should help to insure that the next generation gets its "fair
share," see Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1465 (1989).
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will get less utility from that consumption than one that lives
now would get from consuming the same asset. Whether the
compounded return on the invested asset will create enough
additional consumption to overcome the diminished benefit from
consumption is pure speculation. The question is who should do
the speculating. Should it be judges, legislatures, churches, indi-
viduals or someone else? For purposes of efficiency, the law
ought not interfere with the timing of consumption determined
by the market; efficiency will be maximized by letting the market
strike the balance between generations. 1 5 2
One could argue that consumption of land resources is
more harmful than consumption of other assets. A limitation on
an interest may cause the holder of the interest not to develop
the land or to develop it in a way different from what he would
choose if there were no limitation. This underdevelopment or
misdevelopment is visible to the public more often than misu-
tilization of chattels. Because some people are bothered by the
knowledge of wasted assets and awareness is more likely to be
triggered when the misuse is visible, misuse of land may cause
more harm than a financially equivalent misuse of some other
asset. In other words, misuse of land carries negative externali-
ties not generated by misuse of chattels. 15 3 The inappropriate
development signals its consumption by an earlier generation
and makes that consumption a little more obnoxious. That the
so-called misuse of land may be more harmful than misuse of
other assets does not, however, compel the conclusion that land
transactions should be treated differently. Efficiency ought still
to be enhanced by allowing the market to allocate between
future and present consumption.
B. Avoiding the Conflict Between Generations
Professor Simes viewed the Rule against Perpetuities as a
152. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347-57
(1967). This conclusion might not follow when there is a difference between the social and
private discount rate. For discussion of some of the circumstances in which decision-
makers may insufficiently account for the preferences of future generations, see Williams,
Running Out: The Problem of Exhaustible Resources, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 199 (1978).
See also Solow, Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources, 1974 REv. ECON.
STUD. 29 (1974); Sterk, supra note 150, at 634-41.
153. The costs of multiple negotiations and the free rider problem may prevent those
bothered by the misuse from helping the restricted owner to buy his way free from the
restriction. On the other hand, the sight of misused land may cause happiness in people
who take glee in seeing assets go to waste.
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judicial attempt to improve upon the market balance of the com-
peting interests of successive generations. 154 From that vantage
point, the Rule, by preventing or increasing the cost of certain
forms of consumption, preserves assets for consumption by
future generations. The Rule against Perpetuities need not,
however, be seen only as an attempt to improve that intergenera-
tional balance by shifting happiness from the present to the
future. In some situations the Rule operates far more elegantly.
Rather than striking a balance between the successive genera-
tions, it finesses the situation by allowing both generations to
achieve the happiness derived from consumption. 155 Because of
the Rule, the living misperceive their rights and powers; 156 they
have the impression that they can create and transfer the inter-
ests they desire, consuming as they wish.1 57 Then, after they
die, 158 the Rule voids interests and redistributes the rights, resur-
recting assets and allowing the next generation to consume. 59
In more general terms, after the consumer has taken enjoyment
from consuming but before society has suffered the loss from
that consumption, the Rule steps in to sever the usually inelucta-
ble connection between the two. Beautiful.
C. The Role of Complexity
The intricacy of the Rule is an essential ingredient of this
beneficial misapprehension. 60  The Rule cannot do its job as
well if the public is aware of its operation, and the public will not
154. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
155. Of course the Rule does not finesse the situation entirely. The finesse only works
if the transferor does not learn of the Rule's restrictions. To the extent that transferors
become aware of the Rule and conform to its restrictions, it operates in the manner
suggested by Simes, defining a limit upon the degree of future control that can be exercised
by transferors.
156. The assumption that people continue to make mistakes about things that matter
to them bothers many economists. But the collective experience of lawyers and law
professors indicates that the Rule occasionally does snare important dispositions.
157. That the Rule has the effect of misleading transferors does not imply that it has
that purpose or that anyone intends for transferors to be misled.
158. Obviously, this finesse does not work if the transferor learns of the workings of
the Rule before dying.
159. Professor Dan-Cohen makes a similar point in philosophical terms and in the
context of the criminal law. Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). His phrase "acoustic
separation" refers to the isolation of the decision rules addressed to judges from the rules of
conduct addressed to the general public. Id. at 627, 630.
160. The beauty perceived here, that of having cake and eating it too, is an economic
one. There is no claim here that allowing transferors to misperceive their rights is ethically
beautiful. On the ethics of secrets, see S. BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF
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remain unaware if the Rule is easily understood and communi-
cated. Because it is complex and confounding, the Rule may
redistribute rights to improve efficiency without presenting inef-
ficient incentives to owners and without precluding certain
forms of enjoyment by owners. Even Professor Gray's classic
statement of the Rule serves the goal of misperception without
sacrificing precision or determinacy. "No interest is good unless
it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest." 161 The use of the
triple negative, "no," "unless," and "not," in addition to the
intangible phrase "life in being," works to confuse the lawyer
attempting to apply the Rule to his facts. The law could adopt
an equivalent but simpler configuration for its classic statement
of the Rule. For example: An interest is void if it might vest
more than twenty-one years after the deaths of all persons living
at its creation.162  But such an adoption would reduce the
number of times transferors mistakenly believe they have exe-
cuted an effective instrument. The simpler version would dimin-
ish the Rule's capacity to allow transferors and their successors
to enjoy logically incompatible consumption.163
The use of the triple negative and the existence of plentiful
exceptions to the Rule increase the opportunities for mistakes in
application of the Rule, but those complexities do not make the
Rule less determinate. I64 Professor Gray described the opera-
tion of the common-law Rule as remorseless, 165 an attribute that
precludes considerations such as equity and justice that tend to
fuzziness and indeterminacy when applied to particular cases.
Proper analysis yields correct answers.1 66 The Rule is a laby-
CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION (1982) [hereinafter SECRETS]; S. BOK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978).
161. J. GRAY, supra note 1, § 201.
162. A number of scholars have summarized the Rule using similar language,
Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 1913; Haskell, supra note 3, at 545, yet somehow the classic
statement lives on.
163. The morality of this method of increasing wealth is another question. See infra
subpart VI(C).
164. An analogy to a long and complicated statement of arithmetic equivalence might
make the point more clear. Difficult operations combined with many numbers will cause
many to err in calculating. But regardless of the frequency of error, the statement can be
proved true or false; there is no grey area.
165. J. GRAY, supra note 1, § 629. For argument against the remorseless
construction of the Rule, see VI AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.44 (A. Casner ed.
1952).
166. The Rule is so mechanical that Professor Dukeminier reports he and a student
have succeeded in writing a computer program to solve some perpetuities questions and
758 [Vol. 64
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rinth that may be negotiated with axioms and logic,1 6 7 not an
indeterminate doctrine calling for hunches, guesswork, determi-
nations of reasonableness, or a weighing of considerations.
Many articles on the Rule assume that it is intended to pre-
vent specified, undesirable behaviors and that it contains its own
specific penalty for failure to conform to its restrictions. In
other words, society has implemented or continues to implement
the Rule for the purpose of dissuading transferors from making
the proscribed transfers, thus guiding donative behavior much as
traffic laws are designed to guide vehicle operation. This per-
spective carries with it an assumption that society does not want
people to disobey the Rule's implicit command. Yet a wholly
different standpoint is possible. One could argue instead that it
does not matter what transferors do; as long as the Rule exists, it
will clean up the transfers that have highly detrimental societal
consequences. If the Rule is seen as a curative rather than pre-
ventative measure, its complexity and the concomitant mis-
perceptions serve to reduce some of the harmful effects that
ordinarily attend legal constraints on behavior. Its complexity
allows the Rule to mitigate the detrimental consequences of
transferor behavior without unduly constraining the behavior.
V. SOME HARMFUL EFFECTS OF OBSTRUCTION AND
REDISTRIBUTION
The Rule may be beautiful, 68 but it is not perfect. The
obstruction of transferors' intentions and redistribution of inter-
ests in land and other assets by means of the Rule against Perpe-
tuities can have harmful effects on the transferor and purported
transferees of those interests and might also have an effect on
others who are less involved. The economic benefits identified
above must outweigh these harmful effects for the Rule to yield a
net benefit. The harms fall within familiar categories: elimina-
tion of incentives for productive behavior, preclusion of certain
forms of transferor consumption, diminished happiness due to
redistribution of rights, costs of administering and resolving dis-
putes, costs of attempts to avoid the Rule, and unhappiness or
demoralization engendered in transferors and the public when
they learn of governmental refusals to honor transferor intent.
that the program could be expanded to solve other perpetuities problems. Ninety Years in
Limbo, supra note 36, at 1063 n.91.
167. Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 1867-68.
168. See supra note 160.
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Rather than dividing the harms along those lines, the following
discussion of harms is organized according to who suffers the
harm.
A. Harms to Transferors
One group of persons that comes immediately to mind
when considering harms wrought by the Rule i' transferors.
The potential negative effects on transferors can be divided
according to whether the transferor learns of the restrictions
imposed by the Rule before making the transfer.
1. Transferors that Learn of the Rule
To a transferor that learns of the Rule's restrictions before
she executes the transfer documents, the Rule acts as a barrier
between intent and effectuation. The Rule restricts an owner's
powers of alienation by making it impossible to accomplish cer-
tain transfers. Hence, the Rule qualifies as a restraint on aliena-
tion. Two considerations, however, mitigate the severity of this
restraint. The Rule may be circumvented in many situations
and, where it cannot be, it does not deny terribly important sorts
of transfers.
a. Avoidance is often easy
If a potential transferor learns that the Rule will make inop-
erative certain language that she had planned to use, she may
often accomplish her goals by using a different form of transfer.
Suppose, for example, that a transferor desires to accomplish
what appears to be the goal of the transfer in Example 2 above, a
fee in A that will terminate automatically upon the sale of liquor,
followed by a future interest in B pursuant to which B may take
possession in fee once liquor is sold. Under the common law,
the transferor, 0, may accomplish this end by the simple process
of executing a deed "to A and his heirs until liquor is sold on the
premises," and in a separate, subsequent transaction executing a
deed of all her interest (the possibility of reverter) "to B and his
heirs." 69 Because similar avoidance maneuvers are often avail-
169. L. SIMES, supra note 3, at 71. This scheme will not work when the possibility of
reverter is not alienable. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, para. 37(b) (1969). Professor
Dukeminier describes another indirect way of accomplishing this result. Dukeminier,
supra note 3, at 1906. In some states both schemes will fail because statutes apply the Rule,
or some other durational limitation, to possibilities of reverter. See id. at 1907 nn. 139-40.
Whether such statutes work an improvement over the common-law Rule is an issue not
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able to circumvent the Rule's restrictions, many of the experts in
the field share the opinion that the Rule acts as an absolute bar
to only a very few goals.17 0
Transferors can often circumvent the Rule, and they can do
so at low societal cost. The formulaic aspect of the Rule reduces
the transaction costs associated with avoiding the rule. As put
by Professor Dukeminier, "[t]he essential thing to grasp about
the Rule against Perpetuities is that it is a rule of logical
proof."17 1  The lawyer that spots a questionable interest can
determine mechanically whether the interest violates the Rule.
As a result, little legal effort is wasted in the process of learning
that a new form of transfer is needed. After finding the problem,
the same lawyer who knows enough to spot and resolve the Rule
against Perpetuities issue will, in the usual case, also know
enough of the standard avoidance tactics to be able to draft
around the Rule to accomplish his client's ends. The perpetu-
ities saving clause, for example, stands as a simple means of pre-
serving contingent interests for nearly a century.1 72 Because the
discussed in this Article. They possibly reduce substantially the amount of enjoyment
available to owners without much improvement in collecting interests for the benefit of
transferees or the market.
170. "Practically anything a testator is likely to want can be done within the limits of
the Rule against Perpetuities." Leach, supra note 11, at 669. "[I]n all cases that have
arisen in this century where the gift has failed under the Rule, the instrument could have
been so drafted as to be unchallengeable under the strictest perpetuities doctrine unaided by
legislation." Hail Pennsylvania!, supra note 3, at 1134 (emphasis omitted). Professor
Fetters correctly warns that this fact is irrelevant to the question of dynastic proclivities, see
Reply, supra note 3, at 408-09, but Leach's statement does help to show that the Rule
completely precludes the achievement of very few donative objectives.
171. Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 1880-82. Professor Fletcher makes the same point
thus: "[fjor those who like precision and internal consistency, it has a charming, almost
mathematical quality." Fletcher, supra note 3, at 793. And finally, or originally, Professor
Gray said:
In many legal discussions there is, in the last resort, nothing to say but that one
judge or writer thinks one way, and another writer or judge thinks another way.
There is no exact standard to which appeal may be made. In questions of
remoteness this is not so; there is for them a definite recognized rule: if a decision
agrees with it, it is right; if it does not agree with it, it is wrong. In no part of the
law is the reasoning so mathematical in its character; none has so small a human
element.
V. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES preface (1st ed. 1886).
172. The following example of such a saving clause appears in A. CASNER & W.
LEACH, supra note 17, at 351: "Any interest under [this] instrument that has not vested
within 21 years after death of the survivor of [name a reasonable number of individuals
now in being] shall terminate and the property in which such interest existed shall be
indefeasibly vested in [name takers]." See also Haskell, supra note 3, at 557 n.42. Once
such a clause is inserted into the instrument, all the interests created by the instrument
survive the application of the Rule because they are sure to vest, if they will ever vest,
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mechanical nature of the Rule facilitates avoidance, society
wastes little legal labor on the circumvention of the Rule. 173
Moreover, the costs of avoidance should further diminish in the
future as entrepreneurs bring computer software to the aid of
estate planners. The mechanical nature of the Rule assures low
cost elusion.
For the same reasons, the Rule should not raise large uncer-
tainties in the minds of transferors. Any uncertainty felt by a
transferor that has no lawyer can be, if it is worth it, resolved by
consultation with a lawyer. Unless the legal services necessary
to calm a worried transferor's nerves on a perpetuities issue are
perceived to cost a lot, it is unlikely that the Rule creates sub-
stantial unresolved uncertainties in the minds of transferors
without lawyers.
b. Transfers prohibited are not terribly important
Skirting the Rule, however, is not always possible. One
example of a disposition that cannot be accomplished or even
approximated is one to "the first descendant of Smith to be born
after 200 years from the date this transfer becomes effective."
Although assessing the magnitude of the loss caused by this and
similar unattainable goals is difficult, those losses must be
included in the costs flowing from the existence of the Rule.
This category of costs imposed on transferors contains both the
losses from goals actually prevented and the losses attributable
to lawyers erroneously telling clients that they cannot make a
desired disposition because of the Rule. Would-be transferors
suffer equally whether the Rule actually prevents the transfer or
whether they are merely convinced that it does."7
within the perpetuities period. Presuming that the drafter specifies a dozen healthy babies
as the individuals in being, the contingent interests would be expected to have about 113
years in which to vest before being terminated by the clause. Waggoner, supra note 3, at
161. If everyone were to use such a saving clause, there would be little benefit to the wait-
and-see reform.
173. As is indicated by placement of this discussion in the section identifying harms
to transferors, the societal losses associated with the avoidance of the Rule are usually born
by the transferor in the form of legal fees. These costs have not been described in the text
as legal fee6 because the magnitude of the legal fees overstates the societal losses. The
amount of effort spent by lawyers multiplied by the worth of their time is the relevant
datum on this point. The costs charged to clients might not be a fair measure of the
societal loss because lawyers do not always charge on an hourly basis for such drafting
services. Moreover, they may charge more than their time is worth in other endeavors.
Part of the payments from clients to lawyers caused by the Rule is a societal waste, but not
all. Some portion is a transfer payment by clients to their lawyers.
174. Articles urging reform of the Rule rarely complain that lawyers err on the side
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The losses flowing from preclusion and apparent preclusion
of some transferor goals include both possible incentives for inef-
ficient behavior and loss of consumption value. Some observa-
tions suggest that these losses are not large. If this and other
forms of consumption prohibited by the Rule were important to
a large segment of society, popular calls for reform would arise
and probably succeed.17 5 It is thus reasonable to presume that
no large segment of society has a substantial desire to make
those rare dispositions absolutely precluded by the Rule.
That few, at most, care even enough to call for reform does
not mean that the costs borne by those few, and therefore by
society, are small. The few who suffer might suffer greatly. Or,
they might not. The kinds of transfers absolutely precluded by
the Rule seem not to be those a donor would desire greatly.
Since a perpetuities saving clause can be used to accomplish any
gift that will vest within about a century, the Rule frustrates
only gifts to persons the transferor will not know. For the same
reason, the Rule only prevents achievement of antimarket pref-
erences with regard to dispositions more than 100 years in the
future. The loss of the powers to transfer to unknown persons
and to tie up property beyond 100 years would seem to cause
little loss of happiness. Because few persons have a preference to
make the sorts of transfers absolutely prohibited by the Rule and
the preference is likely to be slight in those that do, the Rule
might not cause great harm by virtue of its total frustration of
some transfers.
of caution, telling clients that the Rule prohibits what it does not. Nevertheless, that is a
possibility. The literature on the Rule gives the impression that lawyers advising clients
about their wills are generally aware of the fact noted above, see supra note 170, that few
desirable goals are absolutely precluded by the Rule, but the point might warrant empirical
study. A survey including the question "Have the restrictions imposed by the Rule against
Perpetuities ever caused you to tell a client that the client's goal could not be achieved?"
could help resolve this question. The dynamics of practice might also indicate that such
false-negative errors are rare. Those who go to lawyers will usually let the lawyer do the
drafting. In such situations, the lawyer is unlikely to say that his wording fails to do the
job.
175. For centuries, from the Statute De Donis to modem condominium and time-
sharing statutes, landholders have turned to legislatures when the common law failed to
recognize transfers for which many felt a need. For further discussion of this point, see T.
BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 15, at 28-29. The comparison with De Donis may be
far-fetched. The better example would be the statutory developments allowing
condominiums and time-sharing arrangements. However, any popularity of the wait-and-
see reform does not necessaril& support the idea that a substantial segment of the
population desires to make the kinds of transfers entirely prohibited by the common-law
Rule because many of these are also forbidden under the reform.
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The experience of specialists supports the conclusion that
the immutable prohibitions of the Rule frustrate few desires.
Professor Dukeminier reports that transferors rarely tie up prop-
erty for even the century that is available under current law. It
would be an odd antimarket preference indeed that valued
highly the right to control a resource in the distant future, but
cared little about tying up the asset during the nearer future. 176
It is impossible to know the extent of the losses imposed upon
those who are completely prevented from accomplishing their
desired dispositions, but in assessing the worth of the Rule those
undetermined costs must, somehow, be weighed against the effi-
ciency gains mentioned above.
To enforce an outright prohibition on the creation of con-
tingent interests might destroy incentives to work or save. But
the Rule, in its common-law formulation, seems to have little of
that effect. Because lawyers know easy ways to avoid the Rule,
and because lawyers will advise with confidence (whether well-
founded or not), the Rule should not substantially influence
work or saving behaviors of clients and should not deprive trans-
ferors of much consumption.
c. Transferors obtain some small benefits
Not only do the losses imposed upon transferors appear
small, the Rule carries some benefits for those who learn of its
operation. The increased scrutiny of critical phrases may cause
transferors to reconsider and clarify their intent. A lawyer that
sees the "unborn widow" defect in the proposed conveyance "to
Smith for life, then to his widow for life, then to the children of
Smith then living"' 7 7 ought at once to inquire of his client as to
whether the remainder for life in the widow might be changed to
a remainder for life in a named person, Grace (the current wife
of Smith). Such an inquiry would alert the client to the possibil-
176. Such an "all or nothing" preference remains a theoretical possibility, however.
For the benefit of those who believe that possibility is substantial, it might be hoped that
one state would abolish the Rule entirely. The expense incurred by those who shift assets
and money to that state to be free of the Rule would give some indication of the minimum
losses caused by the Rule in jurisdictions in which it is retained. The expenses incurred
would give only a rough estimate because some poor donors might greatly desire a
precluded disposition, but lack the money needed to accomplish the transfer to the
jurisdiction allowing perpetuities. The estimate would also fail to account for the
possibility that the preference for perpetuities in land is larger than the preference for
perpetuities in movable assets.
177. See Leach, supra note 11, at 644 example 12; see also supra text accompanying
note 29 (example 3).
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ity of a subsequent marriage to a much younger wife. The client
might then clarify that she meant for the remainder to go to
Grace rather than some other person who happens to be the
widow at Smith's death. In such a case, the existence of the
Rule causes a more careful delineation of the transferor's
intent. 178
A vague awareness of the restrictions of the Rule might also
cause transferors desirous of creating long-term trusts to seek
the assistance of lawyers with expertise in drafting trusts. 179
Such lawyers may then educate their clients to other problems
(unrelated to the Rule) which may arise in the future and thus
help them to provide more effectively for their families and
themselves.18 0 The magnitude of this benefit is inversely related
to the degree of demoralization caused by the Rule.18' If the
public and transferors are generally unaware of the Rule, it cre-
ates little incentive to seek legal advice and very little of the ben-
efit described in this paragraph.8 2 If, however, the Rule creates
178. This added carefulness will benefit directly inter vivos transferors who learn of
the Rule at a later date. It will also benefit society if the more careful language prevents a
later dispute and the associated rent seeking costs. See Stake, supra note 45, at 941-42
(discussing rent seeking concept). This Article hazards no guess as to the magnitude of this
benefit or that identified in the next paragraph. Whether or not they are important,
completeness dictates that they be included here.
The small benefits identified here are not specific to the Rule; they flow from any law
that encourages people to reflect carefully before making decisions. If the issue is which
variation of the Rule is best, the benefits discussed in this subsection might be presumed to
accrue to both variations equally. If, on the other hand, the issue is whether the Rule ought
to be retained or eliminated from the law, the fact that other rules might tend equally to
sharpen intentions is irrelevant to whether the Rule has a marginal effect. If the question is
whether to keep the Rule, the analysis must compare the law with the Rule to the law
without it.
179. See Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 36, at 1057. Professor Dukeminier makes
the point that the common-law Rule is more likely than the Uniform Act to result in
channeling clients desiring to create long-term trusts to lawyers familiar with the problems
of rigid long-term trusts.
180. Similar or better advice might be available from other sources at a lower cost,
but that does not diminish the benefits of the advice given or even suggest that the advice is
not worth the fee. One could argue that because these transferors had already made the
decision that consultation with a lawyer would not be worthwhile, the Rule causes an
inefficient transaction. Of course, the client may have correctly made just such a decision.
The point here is that possibly the client was unaware of important considerations known
to her lawyer and that the consultation on the Rule provided an opportunity for the lawyer
to educate the client. That the client did not, ex ante, think that anything the lawyer would
say would be worth the fee does not prevent the possibility that the exchange was efficient
ex post.
181. See infra text accompanying note 193.
182. It also has little of this beneficial effect if the only people influenced are those
who would have sought legal advice for other reasons anyway.
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substantial uncertainty in transferors, then the existence of the
Rule may also benefit transferors by increasing the chances that
they will plan effectively for their own incapacity and, in the few
situations in which transferors learn of the efficacy of their plans
for others, by improving the effectiveness of their attempts to
provide for their families.18 3
In sum, the Rule against Perpetuities carries benefits for a
few of those transferors that learn of it prior to executing their
instruments of transfer and probably does little damage to the
others because they become aware in time to modify the terms of
their dispositions.
2. Harms to Transferors Ignorant of the Rule
The Rule harms those who are ignorant of its effect even
less than those who are aware. Ignorance of the Rule can arise
in two types of situations: those in which the transferor writes
her own will and those in which the lawyer erroneously advises
her that her intent shall be effectuated. Take first the instance of
a testatrix that writes her own will. Not knowing of the Rule,
she happily writes out some void interest and thereafter remains
in that state of ignorant bliss, enjoying fully the consumptive
benefits of having created and transferred contingent and defea-
sible interests. During her last days she lives under the mistaken
but desirable notion that she has transferred, or will transfer at
her death, her property in divided form to those specified in the
instrument. By the time the apparently intended transfer is nul-
lified, she is dead."" The Rule does nothing to prevent ignorant
183. There is even a benefit to transferors associated with the very preclusion of
certain forms of transfer. The Rule gives those that know of its operation a means of
placating hopeful beneficiaries without actually giving them anything. A transferor who
wishes to appear to have left an interest to a nagging nephew can write a will that includes
an intentionally inoperative clause supposedly leaving a contingent interest to that nephew
without having to actually give the nephew anything. (The same result could also be
accomplished in this instance by the proper execution of a subsequent, secret will. But then
the nephew would blame the transferor, not the law.). By foreclosing a few dispositions,
the Rule creates the possibility of illusory dispositions that will accomplish hidden
objectives. Thus the Rule both eliminates some modes of disposition and creates new
possibilities for those aware of its restrictions. Whether the enlightened transferors gain
much is doubtful, but there is no reason to exclude whatever gains are caused by the
addition of new forms of transfer.
184. The argument in this Article assumes that nothing harms the dead or, more
precisely, that the happiness of the living is all that matters. For an expression of the
opposite view, see J. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 86-91 (1984), reprinted as 1 J.
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1986). Feinberg argues that
someone who falsely blackens the reputation of a dead person has injured the interests of a
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owners from writing their own wills in a way that maximizes
their enjoyment and consumption of the asset.
Violations of the Rule sometimes occur in wills, the invalid-
ity of which the transferor will rarely, presumably never, know.
A transferor may also make an inter vivos transfer that violates
the Rule. This creates no problem in cases where the rights
associated with the voided interest remain with the transferor
because, upon learning of the defect, the transferor can convey
those rights separately to the purported transferee. 185 But there
is a loss if the Rule reallocates rights to an unintended transferee
and the transferor realizes it too late. These losses of transferor
happiness must also be included in the costs of the Rule.
Because of the Rule, some do-it-yourself transferors might
hear about wills in which the intentions of the transferor were
upset. The existence of the Rule and rumors about its operation
could reduce their sense of certainty about their disposition,
increasing their anxiety. For those persons, the existence of the
Rule would decrease the enjoyment associated with the act of
testation. If the uncertainty generated by the existence and
application of the Rule were to cause substantial loss of enjoy-
ment in any particular transferor, however, she would probably
pay the fee necessary to have a lawyer look at the will and
resolve the doubt. The apparent cost of legal advice thus limits
the amount of loss caused by uncertainty felt by an individual. 18 6
In addition, for persons that write their own wills, other defects
are far more likely to result in total or partial intestacy. The
marginal uncertainty caused by the Rule should be small.
Transferors whose lawyers err fair no worse than transfer-
ors that write their own wills since the errant lawyers will con-
vince their clients that their intent will be accomplished by the
instrument drafted. To inspire the confidence of his client and
gain repeat and referral business, the lawyer will apply his per-
suasive skills to the task of convincing the client that the docu-
ment prepared by the lawyer achieves the goals stated by the
client. Not only do lawyers have an incentive for persuading
living person who is no longer with us. The argument here proceeds on the assumption
that the happiness of pre-persons and post-persons ought not to be included in the
utilitarian calculus.
185. This is not possible, however, when the voided interest snaps back as a
possibility of reverter and the possibility of reverter is inalienable.
186. Of course, lack of financial means could prevent a person from going to a lawyer
even though the losses caused by uncertainty were huge. Low cost legal services to the
poor help to assure us these losses are small.
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clients that their work is effective, the lawyers will be aided in
doing so by the nature of the Rule. When the law is indetermi-
nate, lawyers may often be compelled by duty or the possibility
of liability to admit that the pertinent rule is unclear. They must
qualify their predictions and advice according to the ambiguous
nature of the law. But the highly determinate, remorseless
nature of the Rule against Perpetuities, owing to its logical
essence, allows a lawyer to be confident in his opinion. That
confidence allows the lawyer to give his client heartfelt assur-
ances that her goals will be achieved by the language used in the
instrument, even when the lawyer is wrong and has created an
interest void under the Rule. Whether the goals will in fact be
achieved or not, when the lawyer takes the time to become confi-
dent and communicates that confidence to the client, the client
rests easy with the assurance that her will will be given effect.18 7
In other words, the client is allowed the consumption associated
with having created the desired contingent interests, regardless
of whether the lawyer successfully draws up interests that will
eventually be upheld. By the time the lawyer's error is discov-
ered, the client is often, as noted before, dead.188
If a lawyer's error is discovered before the client dies, a will
can be redrafted to avoid the problem. If the defect occurs in an
inter vivos transfer, whether the defect can be cured depends on
whether the Rule caused the rights to be redistributed to the
grantor, in which case the problem might be fixed, or to a prior
transferee, in which case it is too late to implement a remedy. In
the latter case, the client may be able to recover malpractice
damages from the lawyer or his firm, shifting the loss away from
the client, the transferor. Nonetheless, whether compensated or
not, the diminished transferor happiness must be counted as a
cost of the Rule.
B. Harms to Transferees
The existence of the Rule against Perpetuities imposes costs
on transferees as well as on transferors. One of the most obvious
187. Whether lawyers do in fact take the time to reach the level of confidence made
possible by the determinacy of the Rule is open to speculation. The lawyer working for an
hourly fee plainly has a financial incentive to become confident in his opinion. A sense of
professional responsibility may compel other lawyers to research the issue (or ask an
expert's advise) until they are confident.
188. "And so," observes Professor Fetters, "is his incompetent attorney." Notes on
draft returned under cover letter from Professor Samuel Fetters to the author (Feb. 28,
i988).
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costs is the legal expense a transferee incurs in determining the
validity of his interest. But, like the legal costs of circumvention
born by transferors, the legal costs born by transferees should
not be overwhelming. 8 9 The exhaustive explication of its opera-
tion, 190 coupled with the continual refinement of computational
techniques for mechanical resolution of questions, 191 ought to
allow lawyers to determine accurately the validity of interests at
reasonable cost.
The Rule against Perpetuities redistributes rights from an
apparently intended transferee to someone else. Of course these
losses cause some harm to the purported transferees. At this
stage of the analysis, the important question is whether the
harms suffered by transferees outweigh the benefits to the recipi-
ents of the redistributed rights. Because every right lost by one
person is gained by another, the operation of the Rule should, at
worst, generate no losses of enjoyment from existing
resources. 1
92
Whether the operation of the Rule decreases the wealth
derived from assets depends upon the distribution of bundles of
rights as well as the total enjoyability of those packages of rights.
The Rule increases the wealth of transferees as a group if it
redistributes rights to those who would value them more highly,
and decreases wealth if it distributes the rights to those who
value them less. There is at least one argument that the group of
losers differs systematically from the group of winner transferees
as to the valuation of the rights in question.193 The transferor
189. As with transferors, the relevant datum is the value of the time spent by the
lawyer, not the fee charged to the client. See generally supra note 173.
190. See generally J. DUKEMINIER, PERPETUITIES LAW IN ACTION (1962); W.
FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS (1955); J. GRAY, supra note 1; T.
HOoPEs, THE RULES AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1961); R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1966); R. MAUDSLEY, THE MODERN LAW OF PERPETUITIES
(1979); J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (2d ed. 1962).
191. See Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 36, at 1063 n.91; see also Dukeminier,
supra note 3. In addition to computational techniques, scholars continue to develop
improved methods of approaching the Rule so as to resolve perpetuities questions more
quickly and accurately. See generally Fletcher, supra note 3; Lynn, supra note 2; O'Brien,
Analytical Principle: A Guide for Lapse, Survivorship, Death Without Issue, and the Rule,
10 GEO. MASON U.L. REv. 383 (1988). To the extent these efforts result in the Rule being
more widely understood, however, they could increase the costs that arise because the Rule
precludes some forms of consumption. See supra text following note 176.
192. This conclusion depends upon the analysis in subparts II(C)-(D), supra.
193. If one considers utility in addition to wealth, there is another argument against
the Rule. As mentioned above, the Rule tends to reduce the number of holders of rights.
Although the effect appears to be negligible, one could argue that the Rule reduces utility
by concentrating society's wealth in fewer hands.
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truly may know who most needs the rights in question. If the
transferor correctly perceives who would value the asset most
highly under various sets of events, to upset her distribution will
reduce the value of the asset.
A number of observations call into question the common
assumption that the owner will in fact allocate the asset to its
most appreciative user. First, for donative transfers, the trans-
feror lacks the ordinary financial incentives to maximize the
value of the resource. Indeed, as noted above, there are evolu-
tionary reasons to expect that the transferor will try to benefit
blood relatives rather than attempting to transfer rights to the
persons who would benefit most. Second, in all cases involving
an interest that is contingent because it is held by an unidentifi-
able person, the transferor cannot know who the transferee will
be. Hence the transferor has neither insight into the transferee's
preferences nor foresight into the events against which the trans-
feree needs protection or insurance. She cannot be sure that he
will benefit from owning the asset more than anyone else. Even
in transfers where the transferee is named, any interest that vio-
lates the Rule does so because it might vest long after the named
transferee is dead. In those cases, too, the person that takes pos-
session may be a person unknown to the transferor, a person into
whose preferences and insecurities the transferor has little
insight.1 94 Third, the maker of a will obviously has no way to
find out if the will succeeded in creating the happiness intended.
Because the transfers are made by players who are inexperienced
rather than those that the market has selected as proficient
actors, the likelihood of error is greater than in the ordinary
commercial transaction. 195 For these reasons, the law need not
treat transferors as reliable determiners of the most appreciative
recipient.
Despite the points above, there will be cases in which the
transferor, without the aid of a lawyer, correctly evaluates who
would most enjoy the property in various circumstances. And in
some of those cases, the careless use of a term such as "widow"
instead of a person's name or the careless expression of an
upcoming event in terms that suggest no temporal limitation
may cause the Rule to undo the efficient distribution of rights. If
194. However, the known transferee would benefit from owning the rights even
though he might never take possession.
195. See Stake, supra note 45, at 925, 939-40 (discussing the reduced deference to be
accorded the decisions of actors that engage in few transactions).
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such cases are frequent, calls for reform of the Rule are well
founded. 196 But when transferors' parentalistic efforts are misdi-
rected, redistributions effected by the Rule are no more likely to
shift interests from a more appreciative to a less appreciative
person than from one less appreciative to one that is more so.
Although all rights lost by some are gained by others, the
losses may cause more hurt than the gains do happiness. An
unexpected loss may more than offset a larger unexpected
gain. 197 If a majority of the population responds this way to
unexpected changes in endowment, the Rule may net much
unhappiness by its redistributions of rights.
On the other side of the balance, the Rule in some situations
creates benefits for transferees without making a redistribution
of interests. As was noted in the context of benefits for transfer-
ors, 198 awareness of the existence of the Rule will lead some
transferors to seek the aid of lawyers experienced in estate plan-
ning who will help the transferors see problems that might arise
in the future. Hence transferors may improve their assessments
of the needs of their beneficiaries and may improve the quality of
their benevolent dispositions. Thus the Rule can operate to the
benefit of transferees.
C. Harms to Others
1. The Public
The primary negative effects of the Rule against Perpetu-
ities fall upon the transferor and transferees, 199 but persons
unconnected with the transfer may also bear a burden. The
Rule may demoralize those who hear of its operation, even
though they have no interest at stake and no desire to make a
196. It is on this point that those having faith in the efficacy of parentalistic efforts of
transferors will think that the Article underestimates the losses caused by the remorseless
common-law Rule. Leach seems to have been of two minds on this point. At one point he
stated that perpetuities cases deal with persons that have "reasonable plans for the support
of their families," but later in the same article he stated that "[m]any determinable fees
defeat the very purposes for which they were created." Reign of Terror, supra note 3, at
723, 745. Professor Dukeminier has pointed out that the Rule often nullifies the work of a
"thoughtless draftsman" that would have left the testator's descendants in a "straitjacket".
Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 36, at 1037-38.
197. See Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12
HAMLINE L. REV. 385, 397 (1989).
198. See supra text accompanying note 183.
199. In some instances neither the transferor nor any transferee ever notices the
impact of the Rule because no one recognizes that the Rule invalidates an interest. See
Thompson v. Bray, 313 Mass. 717, 49 N.E.2d 228 (1943).
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prohibited transfer.2° Though possible, this seems unlikely
because few ever hear of it.20 1 The absence of public awareness
might be explained in part by the difficulties of communication
and dissemination stemming from the complexity of the Rule.
In any event, before such effects can justify elimination or cur-
tailment of the Rule, empirical study on this point ought to be
done to determine the degree to which the Rule demoralizes the
public.2 ° z
In addition to demoralization costs, the uninvolved public
bears some of the costs of resolving the legal disputes concerning
the Rule for the simple reason that society underwrites the judi-
cial system. The determinacy of the Rule ought to prevent most
Rule against Perpetuities questions from reaching the courts,
thus keeping the expenditure of judicial efforts to a minimum.
Nevertheless, a fair number of cases do reach the courts. 3
More research is needed to determine why these cases get that
far.
Possibly the greatest waste of human capital caused by the
200. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1214-18 (1967)
(introducing demoralization idea in the context of takings law).
201. However, a recent movie, Body Heat, used the Rule as a central plot device.
Body Heat (Warner Bros. Pictures 1981). Of course the purpose of putting the Rule
against Perpetuities violation in Body Heat was theater, not pedagogy. The movie did not
clearly identify the type of transfer that is prohibited. "Everything's in order up to there.
The problem comes in the language of the bequest to Heather. It's a technical matter. In
writing the will I'm afraid Mr. Racine violated what's known as the Rule against
Perpetuities. It forbids an inheritance to be passed down indefinitely for generations." Id.
In addition, the Florida court should have applied the wait-and-see variation of the Rule,
rather than the common-law approach. (According to Professor Dukeminier, this error
crept in when the setting in the movie was changed from New Jersey to Florida. Letter
from Professor Jesse Dukeminier to the author (Mar. 1, 1989)). Nor did the movie
correctly calculate the consequences of a violation. The result in the movie was that the
whole will was invalidated. "It means, I'm afraid, that Edmund's will is invalid. Edmund
Walker died intestate, as though there were no will at all." Body Heat, supra. Moreover,
Professor Dukeminier points out that if the entire will was invalid, the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation might have permitted the probate of the earlier will.
Dukeminier letter, supra. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the movie might have
raised public awareness of the Rule's existence.
202. If the public is generally unaware of any constraints on transfer of interests, and
believes that when a transferor makes a transfer of property the intended transferee gets the
property, the Rule causes no demoralization. The first step in a study might ask a few
simple questions aimed at those two issues. If, on the other hand, the public shows some
awareness of limitations on transfers of interests, a more careful study would be needed to
determine whether the Rule is a partial cause of that awareness and whether that awareness
causes any demoralization.
203. A Westlaw search for "Rule against Perpetuities" returns a response of over
2,000 cases in the "Allstates" file.
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Rule is the inordinate devotion of scholastic effort to the ques-
tion of whether and how the Rule ought to be reformed. Not
only has the Rule absorbed the attention of extremely able
minds for decades, 204 it continues to command a week or more
of study from thousands of law students every year. These costs
certainly help to justify the call for elimination, or possibly sim-
plification, of the Rule.
2. Lawyers that Commit Malpractice
Lawyers too bear costs arising from the existence and com-
plexity of the Rule. Lawyers that favor reform may do so not
only out of genuine concern for the interests of clients (and
resentment arising from the difficult study of the Rule), but also
out of fear of malpractice liability.205 As long as the possibility
of malpractice looms large, the bar will remain uncomfortable
with the Rule.20 6 It is not clear, however, that lawyers ought to
be subject to malpractice for errors in applying the Rule against
Perpetuities. The Rule depends upon the persuasive efforts of
the bar for its ability to redistribute and repackage rights in
resources efficiently without burdening transferors with the frus-
tration of being unable to dispose of their endowment as they
wish. It is by the illusion of allowing the purported disposition
that the Rule manages to achieve its benefits for future genera-
tions without sacrificing the happiness of the transferor.
The lawyer serves his client by convincing her that her
intentions will be accomplished. When the lawyer's failure to
actually achieve those goals is discovered after his client is dead,
his malfeasance does her no harm. Likewise, the imposition of
malpractice liability carries no benefit to the transferor. Indeed,
to make the lawyer liable for his Rule against Perpetuities error
creates an incentive to expend extra effort at his client's expense
without generating any additional benefit for her.
Lawyering that serves the best interests of the transferor
does not always serve the interests of the transferees. To the
204. For relevant commentaries, see supra note 3.
205. Any damage award paid by a lawyer to a successful plaintiff qualifies only as a
transfer payment, not as a societal cost of the Rule above and beyond those costs felt by the
transferor and transferees. But the lawyer found to have committed malpractice may suffer
other injuries to reputation and self esteem which are not offset by an increase in the
welfare of someone else.
206. Professor Dukeminier has seen malpractice liability as a powerful engine of
property law reform. Dukeminier, Cleansing the Stables of Property: A River Found at
Last, 65 IowA L. REv. 151, 159-60 (1979).
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transferees, the effectiveness of the purported transfer always
matters. Unless, however, the lawyer has accepted the job of
protecting the transferees' interests as well as the transferor's,
unwisely ignoring the attendant conflict of interests, °7 the law-
yer ought to have no duty to the transferees. To the benefit of
society, the complexity of the Rule against Perpetuities keeps
transferors uninformed as to the actual effect of their instru-
ments of transfer. Since an essential part of the smoke screen is
the inadvertent and unknowing complicity of the average law-
yer, he ought not to be penalized for or discouraged from play-
ing his part.
Generally, lawyers should be protected from malpractice
liability to persons other than their clients for errors relating to
the Rule. Courts have reached this result on varying theories.
The privity doctrine traditionally has prevented purported trans-
ferees from recovering from the lawyers that drafted the defec-
tive instruments.0 8 Even a court willing to discard the privity
barrier has shielded the lawyer. In a much criticized decision,0 9
Lucas v. Hamm,21 ° the court found that, because the extreme
complexity of the Rule against Perpetuities is beyond the under-
standing of the average lawyer, the defendant lawyer could not
as a matter of law be liable for malpractice in failing to negotiate
successfully the contours of the Rule. Thus the common-law
207. The corollary here is that courts ought to consider the interests of transferors
and transferees to be in conflict.
208. See Lilyhorn v. Dier, 214 Neb. 728, 730, 335 N.W.2d 554, 554-55 (1983); In re
Estate of Cook, 102 Misc. 2d 691, 695, 424 N.Y.S.2d 330, 333 (1980) (in dictum); Victor v.
Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685, 686, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (because of privity
requirement, lawyer not liable to beneficiary of will for malfeasance unrelated to Rule),
aff'd mem., 43 A.D.2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1974); In re Fitzpatrick, 54 O.L.R. 3, 1
D.L.R. 9812, 13 B.C.R. 146 (1923); cf Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879)
(seller's attorney owed no duty of care to buyer of property); Marker v Greenberg, 313
N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1981). See generally, Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 126 (1982) (discussing traditional privity requirement and new theories of
liability). Megarry suggested that the privity requirement is alive in England. Megarry,
Notes, 81 L.Q. REV. 478, 481 (1965).
209. Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 1912 ("It is hard to explain to the public how a
court can, in good conscience, invent a complicated rule, foist it on the public, yet exempt
lawyers from knowing it."); Megarry, supra note 208, at 481 ("[I]t is to be hoped that on
the standard of professional competence [Lucas v. Hamm] will prove to be a slur on the
profession which, like the mule, will display neither pride of ancestry nor hope of
posterity.").
210. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 592, 364 P.2d 685, 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 826 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). But see Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 809 n.2, 121
Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 n.2 (1975) (casting doubt on the continuing viability of the ultimate
conclusion of Lucas).
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privity barrier and the Lucas rule both avoid results that would
create incentives for wasteful lawyer behavior that generates no
additional happiness for clients. Contrary to the indication of
the Lucas opinion, however, lawyers should not be protected
from suits by their own client if the client discovers the lawyer's
error. In such cases the lawyer's error causes harm to his client
which is unmitigated by a benefit to anyone else. 211 By a care-
fully cabined immunity, the law would go a long way toward
reducing the costs of the Rule imposed upon the bar. 2 '
This prospect raises a question for legal educators. If fail-
ures to understand the Rule are not penalized, why bother to
teach the Rule to new lawyers? The answer is that the societal
costs of avoiding the Rule, advising regarding the Rule, and
determining disputes involving the Rule can be kept low only if
the Rule remains reliably determinate. And the Rule can
remain unperceived by transferors only if it remains devilishly
complex. In order to preserve the predictability of the Rule
without compromising its complexity, a cadre of experts must be
maintained. Law schools continue to provide those experts.
VI. A FEW ETHICAL ISSUES
Though the purpose of this Article is to examine economic
costs and benefits of the Rule against Perpetuities, three ethical
questions deserve mention. The first, the ethics of deliberately
ignoring the expressed intent of transferors (especially dead
transferors), is an intractable problem. The second, the dispa-
rate treatment of rich and poor, partially disappears under care-
ful scrutiny. And the third, whether misunderstandings of
transferors might be considered beneficial, raises an issue similar
211. Failing to provide immunity against suits from clients will not wholly undercut
the advantage, discussed above, of eliminating incentives for lawyers to be too careful for
two reasons. First, because perpetuities cases sometimes arise after the death of the
transferor, liability to transferees adds substantially to the lawyer's incentives toward
caution. In other words, liability to transferees should have a large marginal affect on
lawyer behavior. Second, in many of the cases in which a scrivener's violation is discovered
before the transferor dies there is no substantial damage because the document (often a
will) can be superseded with a new instrument.
212. Reduction of malpractice liability would also diminish any existing tendency of
lawyers to err on the side of caution, advising clients that the Rule prohibits a desired
disposition when it does not.
This proposed insulation from malpractice liability to beneficiaries need only extend to
misapplications of the Rule against Perpetuities. A broader immunity might become
generally known to transferors, upsetting them with the thought that their devise might not
succeed and creating the inefficient incentives identified above. See supra subpart III(A).
1990]
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to the ancient question whether it is acceptable to lie for the ben-
efit of one's audience.213
A. Ignoring Intent
The Rule against Perpetuities invalidates clear expressions
of transferor intent. In so doing, the Rule occasions the eco-
nomic costs identified above. But more than that, the Rule
works injustice. By taking the clearly expressed wishes of own-
ers of property and ignoring those wishes, the Rule treats trans-
ferors unfairly. In redistributing rights the Rule also works an
injustice on intended transferees. The owners made transfers
intending certain transferees to have rights, but those rights are
nullified by the Rule. These injustices to transferors and trans-
ferees strike a deeply dissonant chord in many who study the
law, students and professors alike.214 Perhaps it is this sense of
injustice that spurs generation after generation of Perpetuities
scholars to propose reform. But on this aspect many of the pro-
posed reforms will help little. The Rule may be made less unfair
by restricting the frequency of its operation, but justice will suf-
fer as long as the Rule survives.
Some might argue, along lines parallel to those set out by
Simes, that injustices to disappointed transferees are offset by
reduced injustice to prior transferees. The Rule does enhance
the marketability of interests and sometimes frees such interests
from burdensome restrictions, but these improvements do not
reduce injustice. But for the Rule, the transferees would get
exactly the rights the transferor intended them to receive, no
more, no less. That those rights would not be particularly useful
or marketable is no injustice to the prior transferees who often
get the rights for nothing. Their lot is made better by the Rule,
213. The issue is similar to that of the ethics of lying to a person for her own benefit,
but not the same. Inaction that allows misperceptions to continue may be less morally
reprehensible than lying that intentionally causes a misperception. See SECRETS, supra
note 160, at xv ("Lying and secrecy differ, however, in one important respect. Whereas I
take lying to be prima facie wrong, with a negative presumption against it from the outset,
secrecy may not be. Whereas every lie stands in need of justification, all secrets do not.")
The advantages of double consumption occasioned by the misperceptions of transferors are
available without anyone having to lie.
214. One of my strong early impressions of injustice arose when I heard that the
dying request of a local Scrooge, Dirty Ernie (water was too valuable to be used for
bathing), would be ignored. Ernie had requested on his deathbed or in his will, I am not
sure which, that an apartment building not be put on his vacant lot (he had cut the grass of
the lot with scissors). Though my memory may have squeezed events together, it seems
that ground was broken before his body was cold.
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but not more just since there was nothing unjust about receiving
restricted rights in the first place. The Rule, therefore, cannot
rightly be defended as merely choosing between injustices.
One could also argue that, despite its interference with pri-
vate distribution decisions, the Rule works justly if everyone,
winners and losers, would, ex ante, choose to live under the
Rule.21 5 If all would agree in advance of any application of the
Rule that the Rule should be enforced, that ex ante consent
could estop any ex post claim of injustice. But if one maintains
that the right of free disposition is fundamental and that the gov-
ernment cannot, consistent with fairness, redistribute rights for
purposes of efficiency without the actual consent of the losers,
the Rule works unjustly. 216
B. The Disparate Treatment of Rich and Poor
The varying abilities and performances of lawyers With
respect to Rule against Perpetuities issues raises a question of
fairness between rich and poor. The redistributions of rights
wrought by the Rule do not fall on rich and poor alike. There is
a disparate impact: those who spend more to draft their wills
and other documents of transfer more likely will accomplish
their stated purposes. In other words, the rich, or persons that
hire the lawyers of the rich, are more likely to actually consume
their assets in the way they intended, leaving less to their benefi-
ciaries. Assuming the same donative aspirations as the rich,
transferors that lack the assets to hire the best lawyers are more
likely to violate the Rule, resulting in their leaving relatively
more of the potential value of their rights to their successors
because their attempted consumption failed.217 In that light, but
without discounting for the diminished frequency of potentially
violative transfers by poorer persons, the Rule might do more to
215. See generally Michelman, supra note 200.
216. A criticism of the Rule raised by some scholars falls partly under this ethical
point. It has been argued that the Rule should apply to reversionary interests and rights of
entry retained by grantors as well as remainders and executory interests created in grantees.
As a matter of economics, that is no reason to eliminate or water down the Rule; it is better
to have half a loaf than a quarter or none at all. But it does raise a fairness issue. It may be
arbitrary to take away future interests from some for the good of society when similar
future interests are held by others. Whether the Rule ought to apply to interests held by
grantors is beyond the scope of this article, but that question directly implicates the issue of
transferor intent briefly discussed supra in note 28.
217. Some might argue that the poor and lower middle class are highly unlikely to
violate the Rule. If that is so, the argument that the Rule is unfair to the less wealthy is
moot.
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augment the wealth and happiness of those unable to afford
counsel than those rich enough to get good advice. 18
Even ignoring that the successors of the poor fair better
than the successors of the rich, the operation of the Rule might
be characterized by the remark that the rich are allowed to con-
sume more than the poor, a fact inherent in the idea of private
property. The Rule does seem to exacerbate this commonplace
inequality, though, by allowing the rich to consume a greater
percentage of their already greater endowment. The poor are
prevented from consuming all of what little they have. This crit-
icism ultimately fails, however, because the existence of the Rule
does not reduce the value the poor derive from their property.
They have fewer rights, but they do not know that. The Rule
does not deprive the poor of the happiness they would achieve
by successfully dividing up their rights. They get the same hap-
piness allowed the rich. The difference is that their happiness is
built upon a mistaken belief as to the course of future events
whereas the happiness of the rich arises from a belief that will be
confirmed by subsequent events.2 19 The Rule does not treat rich
and poor equally, but regarding happiness22° it treats the poor no
worse than it does the rich. The unavoidable injustice discussed
above, however, does fall disproportionately on the poor.
C. The Ethics of Celebrating Misperceptions
Any reliance upon the misperceptions of grantors as an
excuse for the complexity of the Rule also moves the discussion
toward the ethical arena. By continued application of the Rule,
judges perpetuate a system of legal rules that will not be fully
communicated to transferors. Owners believe they have the
right to dispose of their property as they wish, but the legal real-
ity is different. Modes of disposal are limited by the Rule against
Perpetuities, which continues to survive despite awareness by
the bar and bench that some riiembers of the public misconceive
their rights. Not only does the law condone this state of misin-
formation, it condones the fact that the misinformation will
218. Professor Fetters points out this irony in his entertaining hypothetical
conversation between Professor Dukeminier and a state legislator voting on a perpetuities
reform bill. Reply, supra note 3, at 385.
219. In theory, the poor will also be less able to circumvent the rule. That they
actually feel frustrated by the constraints of the Rule remains doubtful, however.
220. This Article assumes that happiness founded on a never-to-be-exposed illusion is
of equal worth as an emotionally equivalent happiness founded in reality. Happiness is, in
this view, an emotional condition entirely within the individual.
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more likely be disseminated to those persons, generally the poor,
who happen not to hire sufficiently astute lawyers. Because of
the Rule's complexity, the detrimental economic consequences
that would ordinarily accompany a restriction of powers of
alienation are diminished. The ethical question raised by this
economic oddity is whether we should seek to simplify the Rule
to reduce misperceptions or whether we should instead celebrate
the complexities and convolutions that fool individuals into
being happier than they could be, and less consumptive than
they would be, if they were aware of the limits on their rights.
Simplification has its points. For one thing, it reduces the
societal and private costs of determining the answers to ques-
tions raised by the Rule. The question then is whether the con-
fusion generated by the Rule's complexity with its concomitant
reductions in inefficient incentives and increases in happiness
ethically can be urged as a reason to avoid simplification.22" ' If it
is wrong to count the confusion of transferors and the resulting
double consumption as a benefit, the Rule should be simplified,
as long as that can be done without compromising too much the
advantages of improved allocation, heightened enjoyability, and
hastened enjoyment of assets. If, on the other hand, celebrating
the confusion of transferors does not offend ethical precepts,
simplification for the sake of simplification should be resisted.
Which conclusion one reaches depends on the answer to the
question of whether it is acceptable to fail to inform misinformed
people for the sake of their own happiness. 2
VII. CONCLUSION
The Rule both accomplishes beneficial redistributions of
rights and facilitates beneficial reallocations of resources. In this
it is not unique; food stamps and housing programs also combine
redistribution with a dose of paternalism that takes the form of a
prescribed allocation of resources. Yet it is interesting to find a
rule of common law that accomplishes both. The Rule is also a
221. Answering the ethical question by reference to informed consent presents a
difficulty. Would a person, if fully informed and in the ex ante position, agree to a law that
could have the effect of unravelling his testamentary dispositions? The answer from the
fully informed person might well be "no." But that same person might add: "but if you
can now return me to my state of ignorance, I will say yes." As expressed by Bob Seger in
Against the Wind, "I wish I didn't know now what I didn't know then." Seger, Against the
Wind, on AGAINST THE WIND (Capitol Records 1981).
222. See supra note 213.
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rarity in that it accomplishes beneficial redistributions without
systematically shifting rights from the wealthy to those less so.
The Rule against Perpetuities strikes down a variety of
attempted transfers. Each class of attempts can and should be
analyzed to determine whether nullification would generate any
benefits. Three sorts of benefits may accrue from the operation
of the Rule against Perpetuities-improved allocation, enhanced
enjoyability, accelerated enjoyment-and all three must be
explored before one concludes that the Rule ought not to apply
to a given set of transfers. If those three benefits combined do
not suffice to justify the Rule's application, then the transfers in
question ought to be excepted from the operation of the Rule.
Although such exceptions would add complexity, that fact does
not automatically justify resistance to the refinement. As long as
the improvements are mechanical, such embellishments should
cause only small increases in the legal costs of dealing with the
Rule. Moreover, the complexity of the Rule may allow it to
work its beneficial redistributions without fully triggering the
negative consequences for incentives and consumption that ordi-
narily accompany goverlhmental redistributions of property.
Because the Rule is already quite complex and because complex-
ity could be considered a virtue instead of a vice, additional com-
plexity ought not bar refinements of the Rule that would make
its operation conform more closely to the rationales on which it
must rest, the three benefits identified above.2 2 3
The costs and benefits identified herein need not be confined
to use in tinkering with the Rule; they can be used for a more
global assessment of the Rule's economic desirability as well.224
On the negative side of the economic balance are (1) the losses of
transferor consumption; (2) elimination of incentives for produc-
tivity caused by total preclusion of certain forms of transfer; (3)
the difference, if any, between the loss felt by losers and the gain
felt by winners; (4) the costs of administering and resolving dis-
putes revolving around the Rule; (5) the legal costs of attempts
to avoid the Rule; (6) the unhappiness engendered in transferors
that learn of the redistributions; and (7) the demoralization
223. One might argue that the Rule could be recast in terms of those benefits,
allowing courts to decide whether any of the three benefits would accrue if the interest in
question were stricken. A Rule determined on such a case-by-case basis would, however,
greatly increase uncertainty and rent seeking compared with the current overinclusive,
underinclusive, and complex, but highly determinate, Rule.
224. The reader is reminded again that no attempt is made here to suggest the weight
to be given economic considerations in the final analysis.
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caused by public awareness of governmental refusals to honor
the intent of transferors. On the other side of the balance and in
favor of the Rule are (1) improved allocation of assets due to
improved purchasability; (2) enhanced enjoyability due to reduc-
tion of risk; (3) accelerated enjoyment of interests; (4) release of
assets from trusts into more risky investment; and (5) channeling
of transferors to lawyers who might provide informed guidance
regarding problems (unrelated to the Rule) associated with the
proposed disposition. These factors may be applied to determine
the worth of the Rule or any of its suggested replacements.
On a larger scale, there exist plausible reasons to expect that
donative behavior may maximize the benefit derived by the
transferors' genes rather than the benefits derived by the donees.
Therefore, all sorts of donative transfers, not just those implicat-
ing the Rule, should be examined carefully to see whether any of
the resulting distributions of rights are dissimilar to all bundles
of rights the market creates. Categories of results foreign to
market transactions ought to be considered suspect and sub-
jected to greater scrutiny. If the absence of similar market trans-
actions can be explained by identifiable market imperfections or
cognitive imperfections,22 there is no need for the law to correct
a problem-there is no problem to correct. But if the absence of
market transfers cannot be explained away, one should look for
some loss of efficiency that might result from the donative trans-
fer. Of course such efficiency losses do not automatically call for
a legal remedy, but they do demand that the donative transfer be
considered consumption of the transferor. Likewise, any restric-
tions on the structure of donations should be seen as interfer-
ences with transferor consumption, which can create undesirable
incentives. Such a perspective should help us to analyze what
grounds might justify and what harms might flow from interfer-
ing with donative intent.
225. See generally Ulen, supra note 197.
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